LEADER’S HANDBOOK
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The First 100 Days

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
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Foreword

This handbook is written for you, the junior leader. The information it contains is based on surveys of Soldiers and company-level leaders and is presented to help you accomplish your mission and keep your Soldiers alive during the most dangerous and uncertain period of your deployment, the first 100 days.

Our Soldiers demand a lot. They expect us to share their dangers; to listen to them; to be decisive, compassionate, and fair; and to set and enforce high standards always. Every leader’s style is unique, but if you follow these precepts, your Soldiers will accomplish the mission you give them in a professional manner every time.

This handbook discusses keys to being an effective leader, including the following:

• Tough, realistic training in assigned tasks and cross-training in other duties
• Learning from every mission
• Aggressive execution that integrates nonlethal and lethal tools
• Conducting troop-leading procedures and precombat inspections to standard every time
• Avoiding set patterns in daily activities
• Consciously avoiding complacency (Soldiers and leaders)
• Learning at least enough of the language to greet and thank the locals
• Being respectful of the community and involving them in your mission

Your mission as a platoon sergeant, platoon leader, first sergeant, or company commander is a difficult one, one with a huge responsibility to the Soldiers you lead and to your nation. Victory and the lives of your Soldiers ride on your decisions. You have the training and the demonstrated ability to lead or you would not be in your present position. Read this handbook carefully. Take it with you to theater. Get the job done, and bring all your people home.

This handbook is the second in a series based on CALL’s August 2006 Soldier survey. The first in the series, CALL Soldiers’ Handbook, No. 07-15, The First 100 Days, was released in January 2007 and complements this one. Get it and read it. Give it to your Soldiers.

Steven Mains
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned
# First 100 Days Leaders’ Handbook

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CALL publications cover a variety of military topics. The views expressed in this CALL publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
Introduction

“I gave my squad leaders room to build their squad as they saw fit, and they accomplished the mission their own way. [The] majority of the time, I just had to spot-check for quality assurance. I also made myself visible on missions, showing that we all had to be where the action is.”

1st Lieutenant, Infantry Platoon Leader

There is a wide-ranging belief throughout the U.S. Army that the first few weeks of combat are the most dangerous for Soldiers. In this initial period, Soldiers, their leaders, and units acclimatize to the tactical environment, the enemy, and each other. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) set out to examine this period from a Soldier’s point of view. Our task was to analyze Soldier responses to determine what factors contributed most to their survival during the first 100 days of their deployment.

Warfare in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the business of small units, company and below. These units suffer the bulk of the casualties. Therefore, Soldiers and their leadership were the focus of our collection efforts. In August 2006, CALL surveyed Soldiers, collecting more than 1,700 responses.

The survey asked respondents to identify why Soldiers become casualties in the first months of their deployment. The survey collected demographic data and contained questions on general experience, what training most prepared them for combat, how they viewed the unit leadership, and what equipment issues contributed to their survivability.

The information contained in this handbook was derived from what Soldiers and company leaders told us, combined with analysis by subject-matter experts both inside and external to CALL. This handbook, the second in a series based on this survey, addresses leadership issues that Soldiers identified as critical to their survival in those first 100 days. Additionally, this handbook contains other company-level leader areas of interest that have emerged since the 2006 survey.

Taken as a whole, this handbook brings home a tried-and-true fact: Good soldiering makes good Soldiers, and good Soldiers, with effective leaders, make good units that are effective in combat.

This handbook contains no magic formulas, silver bullets, or good-luck charms. It is straight talk derived from the real experiences of Soldiers. Its purpose is to help junior leaders guide their Soldiers through this dangerous period of deployment. Our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism are extremely adaptive. As leaders, you must also demonstrate flexibility in your thinking, and prepare young Soldiers for this war.
Chapter 1
Leadership

Section I: Effective Leadership

“Soldiers, NCOs, and junior leaders need to understand that deploying to Iraq is combat. This is not a peacekeeping mission yet. They must be mentally hardened for the rigors that they will face over here in order maintain their discipline during this mission. Loss of individual discipline is a unit killer, and all small-unit leaders must enforce the standards of discipline that already exist. NCOs must be empowered; they are people who make this mission succeed. Officers are not able to manage company, platoon, squad, and team level actions. They must train and empower their NCOs to lead from their level and do their jobs so that officers can lead platoon and higher operations. OIF is a platoon leader, squad leader war. Our junior leaders must be tough and ready.”

Captain, Company Commander, Infantry Company

“On a trip from our FOB to another, the second vehicle was cut off by a civilian vehicle and smashed into the civilian vehicle’s passenger side. This was on a main highway and traffic was heavy. All of our senior team leaders had been called away that morning so we young sergeants stepped in and led the convoy. Up until that moment I had doubts of whether we were ready to take charge, but then I saw us taking control, cordoning off the area, the 360-degree perimeter with fire superiority; the medics and CLS went into action treating the injured. We recovered the vehicle and took it to our destination. I give all the credit to our training and to our senior NCOs showing us what right looked like every day.”

Sergeant, Section Leader, Combat Arms

Soldiers quickly assessed their leaders once the unit deployed. The majority of Soldiers said the effectiveness of their leaders contributed to their survival during their first 100 days in Iraq. One quarter of the Soldiers surveyed said that ineffective leadership put them at greater risk.

Effective Leadership

The Army teaches core leadership traits at all levels of professional officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) education. Their importance is echoed in the words of Soldiers surveyed for this handbook.

Good leaders do not compromise the basics; they set the example and enforce the standards. Effective leaders rigorously supervise preparation for combat operations. They execute aggressively but retain the ability to meter the requisite mix of lethal and nonlethal means.
Soldiers want their leaders to:

- Display competence and confidence in skills and duties, and take responsibility as the leader.
- Hold subordinates accountable, enforce standards, and always meet standards themselves.
- Have combat experience or learn from subordinates and peers who do.
- Lead from the front and share the risk of combat operations.
- Trust their subordinate leaders and stand by their decisions in the field.
- Adapt quickly to changes in enemy tactics and the situational circumstances.
- Know their Soldiers and care about their protection and welfare.
- Communicate with subordinates and keep Soldiers informed.

**Soldiers made the following comments about effective leadership:**

“Platoon and squad leadership carried the day when you left the FOB. ... The NCOs made the calls as to what we would or would not do once we were on the streets, and they were usually very good calls.”

**Sergeant, Team Leader, Combat Arms**

“Officers in my company constantly checked on us to ensure we were doing the right thing and making adjustments to TTP based on our ability, the threat level, and suggestions from Soldiers.”

**Sergeant, Team Leader, Combat Arms**

“A positive atmosphere and willingness for all to learn helped a lot. Mostly it was the commander understanding the battlefield and allowing junior leaders to make decisions—right or wrong—without being second-guessed. This attitude and trust developed our platoon leaders and platoon sergeants into quality teams on the ground.”

**1st Lieutenant, Company XO, Combat Arms**

“My CO led from the front, kept the NCOs informed, and generally they disseminated information to us very well.”

**Sergeant, Combat Arms**
“Our platoon and squad leaders stressed rehearsals and mission preparation. When we went out the gate, we knew that we had the knowledge and equipment we would need to handle any possible situation.”

Specialist, Combat Arms

“When our XO came on board three months into the deployment, he picked up on the fight some of the junior leaders were having for conducting PCC and PCI and made this a top priority. He set the example by doing so. This enabled junior leaders to run with this and make it work each and every time.”

1st Lieutenant, Military Transition Team

“My platoon leader’s ability to make a decision, stand on it, and see it through. He was not a spineless wimp, and he also was not a one-way s-- of a b----. He never acted brash or careless, but he never backed off the mission and always got the job done. Without recklessly endangering the lives of the Soldiers assigned to him. Not a cowboy … but not a punk.”

Sergeant, Team Leader, Combat Arms

Ineffective Leadership

The Army consistently reinforces the skills all leaders should master; however, Soldiers quickly recognized ineffective leaders. Ineffective leaders, according to one-fourth of Soldiers surveyed:

- Lacked the interpersonal skills needed to lead.
- Lacked tactical competence.
- Lacked combat experience.
- Were unwilling to listen to experienced subordinates.
- Avoided risk in mission execution or in their personal behavior (seldom going outside the forward operating base [FOB] or unwilling to share the hardships of combat).

Soldiers had a special disdain for what they categorized as “careerist” leaders, who want to promote themselves or advance through the ranks (get their “tickets punched”), usually on the sacrifices of their Soldiers.

Other characteristics associated with ineffective leadership include the following:

- Micromanaging (interpreted as a lack of trust in subordinates)
- Lack of aggressiveness in conducting combat operations
- Failure to solicit or listen to advice from combat veterans
- Willingness to put Soldiers at risk unnecessarily
- Lack of moral character
Soldiers made the following comments about ineffective leadership:

“Senior leaders micromanaged way too much, stifling the junior leaders and hurting their ability to learn.”

Staff Sergeant, Squad Leader, Combat Arms

“Our leadership on the whole never went “outside the wire,” but felt comfortable making decisions that sent us into life and death. Leadership should lead when it comes mission time.”

Private First Class, Combat Arms

“The leaders thought they knew what they needed to know, so they didn’t listen to what the experienced Soldiers had to say.”

Specialist, Combat Service Support (CSS)

“I had a young 2LT who thought that leading Soldiers meant belittling his NCOs in front of peers and subordinates. The section sergeant stood up to the LT and put him back in check, with the support of two other platoon leaders. This drew the Soldiers together and reaffirmed confidence in the NCO corps. The LT began trusting his NCOs and respected their input.”

Staff Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant, Combat Arms

“We had one small-arms fire incident where the gate security team and the assigned Iraqi forces set up a defensive posture and then moved against the threat. After the incident and serious incident reports were complete, the NCOIC was called before the battalion staff and admonished for not falling back to the gate and taking cover. The exact words of the S-3 were ‘We are not trained for that.’”

Sergeant First Class, Platoon Sergeant, CSS

“Our CO told us that the leader on the ground makes the decision to fire or not. But when someone did fire, they were always subject to UCMJ, even when all the Soldiers on the ground agreed the shooting was justified. Soldiers were scared to fire their weapons for fear of getting into trouble.”

Staff Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant, Combat Arms
Section II: Using the Experience of Your Veterans

“As an officer, the NCO leadership proved invaluable to both me and the Soldiers around me. NCOs who are combat veterans are a step above the rest. They look out for troopers and always re-check their stuff. Leaders from NCO E-5 to O-3 were involved in the planning, preparation, and execution of every mission.”

Captain, CSS Company Commander

“My platoon sergeant trained me to be a good platoon leader. He knew how green I was; he also knew that I would listen, and soon we had a phenomenal professional relationship that produced outstanding results and increased survivability.”

1st Lieutenant, Tank Platoon Leader

When it comes to combat experience, there are two kinds of leaders in the U.S. Army right now—those who have it and those who will soon get it. Pay attention to the men and women around you who have it. Combat veterans are important sources of information. What they know and what they share with you might save your life. The success or failure of your small-unit mission—fire team, section, squad, or platoon—will depend on the careful duty performance of combat veterans and non-veterans alike.

It is easy to listen to combat veterans if you are junior to them in rank or time in service. It is not so easy if you are a small-unit leader without combat experience leading a group that includes combat veterans. Some of them will be quiet and unassuming, willing to let you lead without comment or criticism. Others may be compliant followers in public but critics behind your back. In order to become tactically confident and competent, you have to develop a leadership philosophy and style to deal with both groups. That development will include both professional development and the use of after-action reviews (AAR) to assess your effectiveness.

The Soldiers you lead demand that they learn from other combat veterans. Using the combat experience of veteran Soldiers validates the training in the eyes of your Soldiers. Integrate the experiences of veteran Soldiers into your training to enhance realism.

Use experienced veterans as a resource when reviewing and refining standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Use situational scenarios based on current or anticipated mission tasks. As your units go through these scenarios, call on the veterans to suggest how they would handle a particular situation. Consolidate, analyze, and adopt the best practices for your unit.

You must be adept at sorting the bravado of war stories from valuable TTP. If combat veterans in your unit brag about experiences that violate the laws of war or rules of engagement, it is your responsibility as a leader to alert the appropriate investigative authority.
Once you deploy, it will take time to acquire combat experience and develop insights. This is not the time to revert to a “do it my way” attitude. When the situation allows and subordinates give advice, weigh it carefully. That Soldier may well have been in the same area or same situation just yesterday and may know the environment better than you do. When appropriate, effective leaders will take the time to consider others’ viewpoints on a situation. All combat missions demand increased risks, and leaders and Soldiers understand and accept this; however, effective leaders will not endanger Soldiers’ lives without good reason.

Unit leaders should develop an understanding that permits them to seek and give advice without compromising their rank or position. Consult each other out of sight and hearing of subordinates, preferably before a decision is announced. Soldiers may know you are discussing an about-to-be-announced decision, but they should not be party to the discussion. When a decision has been affirmed or modified, the officer should direct it, and the NCO should wholeheartedly supervise and execute it along with the Soldiers.
Section III: Adaptability

“The first 100 days will always be the hardest for survivability. The enemy is testing your unit, looking for strengths and weaknesses, and trying to scare you a little bit.”

1st Lieutenant, Support Platoon Leader

“Iraq changes on a day-to-day basis. Any TTP you recognize the enemy is using is usually evolving into something different by the time you implement a countermeasure.”

Sergeant, Scout Platoon

Enemy Adaptability

- Do not fool yourself; the enemy is intelligent, crafty, and adaptive.

- Enemy forces are adept at watching what you do and identifying your habits, patterns, and routines.

- Enemy forces use this knowledge to alter their attack tactics and procedures, exploiting the weaknesses of your forces.

- Remain constantly vigilant for signs of enemy observation; watch for any civilians who seem to have an unwarranted interest in what you are doing.

- Take steps to vary the manner in which you perform everyday actions; monitor your personal habits and those of your team when working “outside the wire.”

- Even small variations in activity can disrupt a planned enemy attack.

The enemy documents many of his attacks on video for use both as a recruiting tool and to dissect the attack; he learns what worked (and what did not work) and changes his tactics accordingly. Review the video exploitation (VEX) section of the CALL Web site, <https://call2.army.mil/new/toc.asp?document=2582>, for videos of insurgent attacks.

The best strategy for countering the enemy’s efforts is to be constantly vigilant for signs of enemy observation, while taking steps to vary how your unit performs everyday actions. Watch for the “cameraman” or any civilian that seems to have an unwarranted interest in what you are doing when patrolling and during convoy operations.

It is natural to follow a routine for conducting daily mission tasks. You must be constantly aware of your personal habits and those of your team when working “outside the wire.” Remind your Soldiers that small changes in how they perform a task from one day to the next can make a big difference. The enemy will spend days and weeks studying you and your unit in an attempt to template your
activities. He will use this template to develop a plan for attacking you or another unit. Even minor variations in activity can disrupt a planned enemy attack. Imagine an enemy’s dismay when the very day he is ready to attack, your patrol departs the gate 45 minutes early and turns in the opposite direction.

“Learn fast from the mistakes of others. Stay alert and focused to the dangers.”

Staff Sergeant, Infantry Squad Leader

Learn From Every Mission

- Conduct AARs after every mission:
  - It is important for all Soldiers to participate in the AAR.
  - Every Soldier has a different perspective of what happened, what he observed, and what the outcome was.
- Ensure your Soldiers share what they did and what they experienced with their peers and with you.
- Seek lessons from other units in your tactical area of operations. Your unit can take advantage of what worked for them and avoid the pitfalls they encountered.
- Conduct a personal AAR on your own actions:
  - How well did you execute your mission tasks?
  - What were the shortcomings in your personal performance and the performance of your unit?
  - How will you make changes to correct the problem?
- Train and drill your unit to correct known problems before the next mission.
- You must analyze every enemy contact:
  - Examine the encounter from both your perspective and the perspective of your enemy:
    * Help your unit leadership reconstruct the actions that took place.
    * Be as accurate as your memory will allow.
    * Do not embellish.
    * Do not avoid talking about mistakes.
º Compare what just happened with the experiences of others in your unit. Can you identify patterns in the way the enemy is operating?
º Was your unit successful? Why?
º Was the enemy successful? Why?
º Watch for enemy tactics and techniques. Did the enemy operate differently this time?

**Risk Mitigation**

- Avoid setting patterns:
  - Whenever possible:
    - Alter routes.
    - Alter timing.
    - Alter commonly witnessed procedures.
    - Avoid displaying the extent of your boundary area.

- Assess and plan for the relevant threats, particularly complex attacks.
- Rehearse potential enemy tactics to better prepare yourself for any eventuality.
- Have clearly understood and well-rehearsed “actions on” procedures relevant to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat.
- Portray a strong and vigilant presence.
- Always be on the lookout for suspicious activity or indicators.
- Maintain regular communication with your unit while on the move.
- Know the route and look for changes on the return leg (e.g., the sign suspended from an overpass was not there when you passed by earlier).
- Beware of the unusual, expect the unexpected, and react quickly and decisively.
Section IV: Complacency

“A lot of times you hear about Soldiers trying to take shortcuts or becoming complacent and that’s when people get hurt.”

Staff Sergeant, Tank Commander

Complacency is cited most often as the primary factor contributing to Soldier casualties in Iraq. The following descriptions help to illustrate complacency:

- Being unaware of surroundings (lack of situational awareness)
- Lack of attention to detail
- Failure to follow established standards or procedures
- Carelessness
- Lack of discipline
- Lost battlefield focus
- Did not bring “A” game
- Did not have head in the game
- Underestimated or did not have respect for the enemy
- Got too comfortable with surroundings

The key element of complacency is Soldier attitude, which is shaped by your leadership at the small-unit level. Soldiers cannot be complacent, and you, as their leader, must recognize complacency in Soldiers and take immediate corrective action.

Small-Unit Leadership and Complacency

Small-unit leaders, like the Soldiers they lead, have identified complacency as a major contributor to casualties in Iraq. Furthermore, small-unit leaders—noncommissioned and commissioned officers at the company level—are fully aware of their role in recognizing and preventing complacency.
In the following examples, small-unit leaders relate how they prevented complacency in their unit:

- “Ensured my tank crew was cross-trained in all crew positions. Letting the crew rotate helped combat complacency.”
- “Gave constant training and tried to keep implementing the rules, trying to advise the Soldiers not to get complacent with their territory.”
- “Always checking my Soldiers to avoid any complacency.”
- “Fight complacency with creative training and scenarios.”
- “Trained for our mission. Trained more when the mission changed. Didn’t let my Soldiers get complacent.”
- “Enforced discipline as it applied to combat situations; tried not to dwell on trivial things. Constantly reminded them during the lulls that we were still in a combat zone; didn’t tolerate complacency.”

Three common threads emerge from these comments: training, checking, and enforcing, which are core NCO responsibilities.

**Training**

You should train your Soldiers on all individual skills required to perform the unit’s mission. Train to shoot, move, communicate, and survive.

Recognize the necessity of cross-training. Soldiers should be able to accomplish the basic tasks performed by other personnel in their crew, team, or section. One clear example of this principle is the cross-training of vehicle and weapons-system crews. Any crewman of an Abrams tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle should be able to perform the duties of any other crewman. In like manner, Soldiers who work side-by-side in a transportation unit, supply facility, or maintenance shop should be able to perform, within reason, the tasks of their co-workers. You, the leader, are responsible for developing and conducting this cross-training.

Additionally, due to the nature of the current conflict, many Soldiers are performing duties outside their primary military occupational specialty (MOS). Entire units have deployed with reduced modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE). Some units have been assigned missions not typically performed by their unit. Nonetheless, these Soldiers must remain current in their MOS in order to be competitive for advancement. It is your responsibility to make sure your Soldiers keep their MOS skills current. Training, whether for current assigned duties or for MOS-proficiency retention, is an effective activity for preventing complacency.
Checking

Everyone has heard some variation of this expression: “Subordinates perform best those tasks the boss checks.” The Army has both informal and formal systems for checking performance.

The informal system begins with self and buddy checks. Look at your own work and your own gear to identify shortfalls. Then look at the Soldiers and leaders on your right and left to see if they have forgotten something. Out of concern for yourselves and others, you should ask or remind others: “Do you have this?” or “Don’t forget that.” Every Soldier and leader should know if a fragmentation grenade is improperly secured to an outer tactical vest. Every member of a rifle squad should be interested in whether the squad automatic weapon gunner performed proper maintenance on his weapon and if he and his assistant(s) are carrying the appropriate number of rounds for the mission. Every member of a helicopter crew should be interested in whether the crew chief executed the daily preflight maintenance tasks with due diligence. Every passenger of a vehicle in a combat logistics patrol should be concerned that the driver and vehicle commander know all the pertinent details of the route to be followed and so on and so forth.

The formal systems for checking include, but are not limited to, precombat checks and precombat inspections. Regardless of who performs these checks and inspections—a squad leader, senior NCO, or an officer in the chain of command—they should be accomplished before any unit departs on a mission. Failure to conduct such checks and inspections suggests small-unit leader complacency and sets a bad example for Soldiers.

Enforcement

When a check or inspection reveals a deficiency or shortfall, some corrective action should result. It may be as simple as sending a Soldier back to his personal area to retrieve a piece of missing equipment or as complex as reshuffling the march order of an entire column of vehicles to ensure the gun trucks or counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW)-equipped vehicles are positioned properly. Although corrective action normally suffices, small-unit leaders may occasionally have to resort to punitive actions to get and hold Soldiers’ attention. When it comes to their own safety, however, most Soldiers will respond appropriately to positive enforcement measures.

Avoid Routine and Patterns

Some routine is necessary to complete tasks on the FOB, patrol base, joint security station, etc.; however, that same routine can lead to trouble when applied to tactical actions outside the secure area.

- The enemy is always watching, looking for repeated behavior patterns they can exploit.
- Identify patterns and routines in your own tactical actions and look for creative ways to break the patterns but still accomplish the mission.
- Avoid being templated by the enemy. Vary times, routes, organization of the march column, reactions, and other routine actions.
Recognizing Stress and Fatigue

A stressor is any event or situation that requires a nonroutine change in adaptation or behavior:

- Physical stressors include external environmental conditions such as heat and noise, equipment weight, and the terrain underfoot.
- Mental stressors involve information that places demands on either your thoughts or feelings.
- Combat stressors can be physical or mental and occur during the course of combat-related duties. Combat stressors can result from enemy action, your unit, or your home life.

Stress is what your body and mind do to counteract stressors:

- Positive stress helps you respond appropriately to normal stressors; some amount of stress is necessary to prompt effective responses.
- Too little stress may make you distracted, forgetful, or cause you to fall asleep.
- Too much stress may make you focus on only one aspect of a task, neglecting the larger picture.
- Extreme stress may cause you to “freeze up” or become agitated and flee.
- Prolonged extreme stress can cause physical and mental disablement.

Physical fatigue results from:

- Hard or prolonged work.
- Muscle tiredness.
- Aerobic fatigue.
- Sleep deprivation.
- Physical illness.
- Intense emotions, such as anxiety and fear.

Mental fatigue results from:

- Prolonged mental effort on a specific task.
- Emotions such as boredom or uncertainty.
• Inappropriate reactions to combat-induced stress are called misconduct stress behavior and include unacceptable and even criminal activities, such as:
  ° Substance abuse.
  ° Brutal violence.
  ° Recklessness.
  ° Desertion.
  ° Malingering.
  ° Fraternization.

Battle fatigue/combat stress reaction is usually present at some level in all unit personnel in a theater of combat operations.

Soldiers and leaders are responsible for identifying personnel who require treatment for battle fatigue or combat stress reaction. Watch for stress indicators in your peers and encourage other Soldiers to self-report. The key element of complacency is your attitude.
Chapter 1, Annex 1

Coping With Stress in Stability and Support Operations

The information contained in this annex was extracted from Tip Card #02, Coping with Stress in Stability and Support Operations, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, March 2004.

At its worst, the day-to-day stress that comes with stability and support operations can be as stressful as major combat operations. The danger may be high, and the mission may be unclear. Some civilians may be hostile, and the rules of engagement may be more stringent. It is often difficult to recognize threats, and concrete progress is sometimes difficult to see. Boredom, the lack of privacy, restricted movement, and separation from home further add to the stress. Under these conditions, anyone can begin to show signs of distress, and it is important to know how you can help yourself and your buddy.

Learn effective relaxation techniques:

- Play cards or sports.
- Talk with friends.
- Write a letter or diary.
- Read a book.
- Take slow, deep breaths.
- Imagine a favorite place.

These techniques can help you refocus in action, recharge after grueling or boring work, and relax in order to sleep. Request training on relaxation techniques from mental health or combat stress control teams and unit ministry teams in your area.

What to do for yourself:

- Remind yourself that these feelings are normal, given the situation.
- Get enough sleep, food, water, and exercise. If you are physically stressed, your ability to deal with the day-to-day stressors of stability and support operations is reduced.
- Focus on the mission at hand. Break down objectives into smaller tasks, and reward yourself with rest breaks after each task is accomplished.
- Stay connected with buddies in your unit.
- Maintain contact with friends and family at home whenever you can. If something at home is bothering you, talk about it with your buddies, your leaders, or anyone else you trust.
- If things start to feel out of control, talk to your unit sergeant, chaplain, medic, or commander as soon as possible.
What to do for your buddies:

- Know the members of your team, and welcome newcomers when they arrive. Help them learn skills they need.
- Be on the lookout for sudden changes in how your buddies act. If you see such changes, ask them about it.
- Include your buddies and new Soldiers in relaxing activities.
- Offer encouragement and recognition when your buddies do something well.
- If you are concerned for your buddies, talk to them about how they are doing.
- If you think that your buddy may be having a hard time and will not talk to you, let your leadership know about your concern.

What to do for your subordinates:

- Keep your team informed of new developments but be careful not to pass on rumors.
- Be on the lookout for changes in behavior or performance and act to address issues before they become problems.
- Organize team events to help Soldiers relax and have some fun. Give subordinates private time whenever possible.
- Ask team members how they are handling the deployment and how things are going back home.
- Ensure subordinates get a fair share of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities and communication from home.
- If you are concerned about certain Soldiers, talk to them and listen to what they have to say.
- Conduct sensing sessions as frequently as possible, and make sure Soldiers’ feelings are expressed and heard.
- If necessary, refer Soldiers to unit chaplains, mental health, or combat stress control team assets for help.
Chapter 1, Annex 2

Helping a Soldier in Distress

The information contained in this annex was extracted from Tip Card #03, *OIF Tips – Helping a Soldier in Distress, Leader’s Hip Pocket Training Guide*, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, March 2004.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Soldiers face difficult situations every day:

- Seeing destroyed homes, dead bodies, and human remains
- Being the object of hostile reactions from civilians
- Being ambushed, receiving small-arms fire, or being attacked with improvised explosive devices
- Knowing or seeing someone seriously injured or killed and having close calls with death
- Enduring long deployments and the lack or privacy and personal space
- Being separated from family or having difficulty communicating with home

If you see a fellow Soldier who is upset, fuming, or brooding alone, you can help him through a painful and sometimes risky time. Emotionally distracted Soldiers can endanger the mission, the unit, and themselves. Often, just talking to a friend (or leader) who listens, tries to understand, and praises his strengths is all a Soldier needs to find his own answers.

1. Be a good friend. You might say, “Something seems to be bothering you. How can I help? I can listen without being upset.”

2. Listen attentively and encourage the Soldier to tell you what is wrong. Stay calm and objective. Do not criticize or argue with the Soldier. Listen to the Soldier’s thoughts and feelings and allow time for him/her to find words.

3. Acknowledge the Soldier’s grievances against others, but do not amplify them by agreeing too strongly.

4. Ask questions to help you understand the problem and the Soldier’s feelings. If communication stalls, try to summarize what has been said and ask if you understand the issue correctly.

5. Delay offering different perspectives or practical advice until you grasp the situation and understand why the Soldier is upset.

6. Plant the seeds of new ideas. Do not drive them in with a hammer.

7. Praise the Soldier for his/her work under difficult circumstances and for talking with you.
Sometimes the problems are too big to resolve after one talk or without additional, outside help. Additional help for Soldiers is available from:

- Unit ministry teams (UMTs) in the maneuver battalions, brigade headquarters, and hospitals. UMTs also provide area support in corps areas and Kuwait.

- The primary medical providers in battalion aid stations and medical companies. As well as providing support to Soldiers, they should know where other support assets are located and how to contact them.

- Mental health officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists at the brigade, division, and area support medical companies.

- Mental health officers and enlisted personnel in combat stress control teams.

If the Soldier seems preoccupied with death, hints at having thoughts of suicide, or makes threats toward others, remember your suicide prevention training.

- Say something such as, “I can see that you feel distressed.” “Have you thought of hurting yourself or someone else?” or “Do you wish you were dead?”

- Follow-up with, “Have you thought of how you could kill yourself?” (or others).

- Don’t act shocked or alarmed. Encourage the Soldier to talk using the techniques on this card.

- If the Soldier is armed, say something such as, “Let me unload your weapon and keep it safe for you while we talk.”

- After the Soldier has talked as much as he wants, say something such as, “I need to get you help for this. There are people near who can help you.”

- Don’t leave this person alone. Secure any weapons. Immediately take the Soldier to your chain of command or to a medical care facility.

A SUICIDAL PERSON NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.
In combat or disaster situations, you may see, hear, smell, and perhaps have to handle badly injured and dead men, women, and children of all ages.

You may be struck with mixed feelings of pity, horror, revulsion, and anger at the senselessness or malice of the event. It is even more painful when a victim reminds you of someone you love or yourself. You may feel guilty for failing to prevent it, for surviving it, or for not helping enough. These reactions are normal, a part of being human. You may blame yourself or the United States.

Keep in mind that these feelings are honorable and confirm your humanity. At times, however, you may feel emotionally numb and may use “graveyard humor” to make the suffering and deaths seem less terrible. Whatever you feel, remember that the mission must continue.

What follows are lessons learned from people who have faced such horrible experiences. These tips can help you conduct the mission and live with the memories without being haunted by them.

1. Remember the larger purpose of what you must do. You are showing care, giving hope, and preventing disease for the living. You are recovering the bodies for registrations and respectful burial.

2. Limit exposure to the stimuli: Do not sightsee; use screens, poncho curtains, partitions, covers, body bags, and barriers to keep away anyone who does not need to see.

3. Wear gloves and disposable uniforms if available.

4. Mask odors with disinfectants, deodorants, or air fresheners. Save perfumes or aftershaves for afterwards. Do not be surprised when odors trigger memories.

5. Be compassionate, but avoid focusing on any individual victims, especially those you most identify with. Do not focus on personal effects.

6. Personnel who did not search the body should examine any materials collected for identification of the body or intelligence.

7. Remind yourself the body is not “the person,” just the remains.

8. Keep humor alive, even “graveyard humor” with buddies who understand it, but do not get too graphic or too personal (do not pick on each other).

9. Do not desecrate or steal from the victims; those actions are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
10. Ask unit or local ministers to conduct memorial services and perform personal religious rituals as appropriate.

11. Schedule frequent breaks; maintain hygiene, drink plenty of fluids, and eat good food. Command should arrange facilities for washing hands and face, followed later by showers and fresh clothes.

12. Have your team get together for mutual support and encouragement. Acknowledge the horrible aspects of the situation, but do not dwell on detailed memories.

13. Help buddies or subordinates in distress by being a good listener. Do not jump in with “off the shelf” answers. Do not mistake feelings as weakness; communicate that these feelings are normal and honorable. Remind subordinates that the mission must go on, and the team needs everyone.

14. If forewarned of the mission, prepare yourself for what you will see and do and take the supplies and equipment mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.

15. After the mission is complete, do not feel guilty about distancing yourself mentally from the suffering or tragic deaths of individuals.

16. Do not be disheartened by horrible dreams, feeling tense, or intrusive memories. These reactions are normal, and it is better to acknowledge them now than to suppress them. Share these reactions with your buddies, and keep positive humor alive.

17. One to three days after the exposure to a stressful event, participate in a critical event debriefing with trained people from your supporting unit ministry and/or behavioral health/combat stress control team.

These techniques and coping skills cannot make a horrible and tragic event acceptable or easy, but they can help you and your teammates better cope with the stress in order to complete the mission. Be proud of what you have done, and use these lessons learned to take care of yourself, your buddies, and your family when you get home.
Chapter 2
Skills

Section I: Predeployment Training and Activities

“

The reflexive fire, close-quarters combat training, entering and clearing potentially hostile buildings are very important, prevent fratricide, build teams. It got guys in the right mindset, also what to look for when about to commit to clearing and searching.”

1st Lieutenant, Infantry Platoon Leader

“CEP drills and TTP were gone over so much that they became natural reactions. Even though when we got in country and did our right-seat rides and saw how our training was different from what the current threat was … we had no troubles adapting and changing, because we had the basics down.

Sergeant, Squad Leader, Armored Cavalry Troop

“I would learn more Arabic and ensure my Soldiers did also. Iraqis are impressed when you use their language. It breaks their stereotypes that we want to impose our culture on them. We picked up what we needed after the first few months, but we definitely could have used more language training.”

Captain, Reconnaissance Troop Commander

What you do for your Soldiers in predeployment training is the most important factor in increasing their ability to survive in combat. Do not take any of the training for granted. In addition, when there is an opportunity to do additional work, take advantage of that opportunity. Training is the one thing that leaders influence directly. Predeployment training:

• Provides an opportunity to build combat skills.

• Builds “muscle memory,” which is critical to Soldiers reacting correctly the first time they experience combat.

• Allows you and your Soldiers to solidify as a team.

• Trains Soldiers to get comfortable with carrying a weapon with live ammunition and teaches “muzzle awareness.”

Predeployment training must be up-to-date with the current tactical environment. Small units are constantly adapting tactics and procedures as the situation and enemy techniques change.

Predeployment training must be realistic. This realism starts with the training you conduct at home station. Look to combat veterans in your unit as a way for measuring the realism of the training. Soldiers and leaders with combat experience should conduct training for units readying for combat.
Critical Training

Soldiers surveyed identified the following areas of training as the most critical to surviving combat in Iraq:

- Language and culture
- Counter improvised explosive device (IED) and IED defeat (IEDD)
- Weapons marksmanship and close-quarters marksmanship (CQM)
- Close-quarters battle (CQB)
- Convoy operations
- Physical fitness

Language and Cultural Training

Many Soldiers came back from their first deployment wanting more training in the language of the Iraqis and the Iraqi culture. They needed this training to better perform their daily missions and build rapport with the people. Units that have specific duties or missions involving routine contact with Iraqis (entry control, detainee holding area) will need additional language and cultural training. Leaders must identify resources for this training and make it happen early in the training cycle. Integrate language and cultural lessons into other training to add realism. Keep in mind that every Soldier is an ambassador in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

IED Defeat Training

IEDs represent the biggest threat to U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of operations. But the right training and proper practices will significantly reduce the threat of an IED attack. Leaders at every level of command must ensure that their Soldiers get good, effective IEDD training.

IEDD training must be up-to-date and counter the latest enemy techniques and tactics. Current techniques and practices for countering IEDs are gathered from Soldiers and small units with many months of experience. When you conduct IEDD training, concentrate on these techniques until they become second nature.

It is your job to ensure that each Soldier understands IEDD. Encourage your Soldiers to use every opportunity to practice the IEDD techniques learned in training. Develop scenarios that allow them to act out the role of an IED bomber. Direct them to answer the following questions:

- Where might be good a location to place an IED?
- Where would I place an IED so that I know it will hit the intended target?
- How would I hide the IED (“in plain sight” can be an effective way of disguising the IED)?
- As the triggerman, where would I hide and how would I initiate the attack?
Next, reverse roles and ask each Soldier the following questions:

- If an IED detonated right now, how would you react?
- What are your immediate actions?
- Where is your escape route out of the ambush?

**Weapons Marksmanship Skills**

A basic tenet of the Army is that each Soldier is trained and ready to use his individual weapon. As a leader, marksmanship training is your responsibility. All Soldiers will need some advanced marksmanship training to survive the type of engagements encountered in Iraq. No military specialty or duty position will exempt any Soldier from the possibility of engaging the enemy in close combat. Every unit in the Iraqi operational environment is susceptible to enemy ambush or small-arms attack. Training on the advanced marksmanship techniques of reflexive fire and CQM cannot start without Soldiers first being competent at the basics.

**Basic marksmanship**

Train Soldiers to be confident with their weapons and competent in their ability to hit a target under varied conditions. This confidence begins with basic weapons marksmanship skills. Marksmanship starts by applying the fundamentals of marksmanship taught in initial entry training, followed by properly “zeroing” the weapon sights. Leaders should train Soldiers to:

- Periodically confirm their weapon’s zero (sights will be jostled over time).
- Zero the “iron sights” first, then move to combat optics. Repeat the process until they achieve a good zero with both sights.
- Perfect this process, firing as many rounds as necessary to be certain the weapon is accurately “zeroed.”
- Follow-up with basic range qualification until they are confident in their ability to hit a designated target.

**Close-quarters marksmanship/Reflexive fire**

Leaders should train Soldiers to:

- Use the reflexive fire techniques (proper weapon-ready stance, aiming, shot placement, and trigger manipulation) to quickly and effectively engage targets at ranges under 25 meters. Reflexive fire helps Soldiers identify and discriminate between targets in a close-quarters fight, make shoot/no-shoot decisions, and react.
- Practice reflexive fire techniques until they can quickly hit a target without taking careful aim.
Pay attention to the following fundamentals of advanced marksmanship training and practice these fundamentals until they are proficient in CQM and reflexive fire:

- Stance
- Grip
- Sight alignment
- Sight picture
- Breathing
- Recovery
- Follow-through

Close-Quarters Battle

Much of the fighting in Iraq occurs on urban terrain (confined spaces; streets; small, open areas; and buildings), which requires small units to fight a CQB. In order to be successful, train Soldiers on the principles of CQB: surprise, speed, and controlled violence of action.

Rehearsals are the single most important thing you can do for your Soldiers. Rehearse how to move through a room, building, street, or open area. Rehearsals train the Soldiers how to become accustomed to the feel of CQB and experience the problems associated with it. Just as repetition is the key to learning immediate action drills, Soldiers should practice CQB repeatedly until they are able to react correctly without much thought. When you train, focus on flexibility and reacting to the unknown (no two streets, buildings, or rooms are the same). Also, whenever possible, train with the team members you will fight with. Make every effort to keep that team together in combat.

Convoy Training and Convoy Live Fire Training

One of the most dangerous activities in Iraq is moving in a convoy. The insurgents’ primary reason for targeting convoys is their perception that convoys are easy prey and cannot conduct a successful defense. Convoy training teaches the responsibilities for each crew position (driver, commander, or gunner).

Convoy fundamentals

- Movement drills:
  - Scanning responsibilities and 360-degree security
  - Techniques for keeping standoff with a potential threat
- Actions on halts:
  - 5- and 25-meter (5/25) crew halt drill
  - Clear, confirm, cordon, control, and check (5 C’s)
Convoy training continues with live fire training in both moving and stationary situations. Train Soldiers to fire on targets in all directions (to the sides, front, and rear) simultaneously. Emphasize muzzle awareness and individual fire discipline techniques. Crew positions will dictate the firing technique. Train the appropriate techniques to each crew member.

**Physical Fitness Training**

Every leader must stay in good physical condition. The extremes of operating in Iraq (climate, combat tasks, and stress) place an even greater emphasis on being in the best physical shape possible. Soldiers in good shape are better capable of surviving because they are better capable of handling the fatigue and stress brought on by the rigors of daily tasks. Fatigue is a major cause of complacency, a major factor in a Soldier’s risk of becoming a casualty. Officers and noncommissioned officers are not immune to the physical demands of combat. You cannot function if you are not physically ready to keep up with your Soldiers.

(Note: CALL has a large number of references and training tools available to assist the company leadership in focusing on predeployment training. The CALL Web site has a page listing all the Forces Command (FORSCOM) mandatory training requirements with links to training materials, CALL products, and other training aids. The CALL DOD restricted unclassified Web site address is <http://call.army.mil>. The CALL classified Web site address is <https://call.army.smil.mil>.)
Section II: Cross-Training

“[Conduct] a lot more rehearsals with the team with each person talking through not only their task, but the task of everyone on the team.”

1st Lieutenant, Platoon Leader

“... everyone should know how to operate the GPS, SINCGARS, and all the weapons systems.”

Master Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant

Cross-training means that Soldiers know their job and the jobs of others in the squad or section and can take over another Soldier’s role in the operation. Cross-training does not mean Soldiers are qualified in a second military occupational specialty. Cross-training also prepares each Soldier to take charge of a situation if you, their primary leader, become a casualty. The goal of cross-training is to fill those key positions that are critical to the survival of unit and completion of the mission.

- Every Soldier must know the unit’s mission and the commander’s intent.
- Every Soldier must know the unit’s general location and be able to determine its specific location on a paper map or electronic locating device.
- Every Soldier must know the unit’s call sign and the call sign of the next higher echelon.

Before you can begin, you (the leader) must have functional knowledge in the operation of the unit vehicle, its communications equipment, protective equipment, and weapons.

Critical Areas for Leader’s Focus

Individual and crew-served weapons

- Soldiers in combat must be able to perform function checks (loading ammunition, readying to fire, and clearing stoppages) and employ every individual and crew-served weapon assigned to the squad or section.
- Crew members of a combat vehicle, such as a tank or infantry fighting vehicle, should be able to employ the primary weapon and all secondary weapons mounted on or carried in that vehicle.
- Proficiency in the employment of crew-served weapons is particularly important to combat support and combat service support Soldiers, whose everyday duties do not normally require weapons employment.
Communications

- Communication is critical in a fight. Train every Soldier to operate the basic communications equipment of the squad or section.

- Soldiers must know how to report their unit’s location and situation, how to request MEDEVAC, and how to identify themselves to friendly forces that are coming to their assistance.

- Go over the required reports for situations, such as calling explosive ordnance disposal, reporting an IED, or giving a situation report.

Other key tasks

Train Soldiers to drive any common vehicle in an emergency, even if they are not the assigned drivers. The same holds true for specialized engineer or support vehicles.

Train Soldiers to employ other systems that are unique to the unit and its mission, such as navigation and reporting systems (Blue Force Tracker) and protective systems, such as CREW (counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare) equipment.

Use precombat preparations to rehearse each Soldier in his personal mission tasks and those of the other Soldiers on the team. Have the driver and the gunner practice radio-telephone procedures and reporting. Have the vehicle commander practice taking over as the driver or gunner. At random, pick a Soldier and have him take over as squad/team leader; explaining his immediate actions to secure a situation. It is too late to teach someone how to operate the .50-caliber machine gun or how to call for a MEDEVAC when your squad is suddenly caught in an IED ambush or taking small-arms fire. In a critical situation, the ability of your Soldiers to respond quickly may save the lives of others.
Section III: Cultural and Situational Awareness

“I want to re-stress humanizing yourself to the Iraqis. The unit that replaced us had a ‘we don’t talk to Iraqis’ policy. And they had a much rougher time in our previously quiet area.”

Staff Sergeant, Infantry Squad Leader

“Remember that not every Iraqi is out to kill you. Helping the public will help you. A small child told us of an IED because we gave him a stuffed animal the day before.”

Sergeant, Combat Support

“I learned that the average Iraqi male has a sense of personal honor that far eclipses anything an American can understand and that treating people in accordance with their customs and norms is vital to our force protection efforts. Soldiers need to know that treating the Iraqi people with dignity and respect is a life-or-death matter because if they don’t the Iraqi men will conduct or aid AIF actions to avenge their personal honor.

Captain, Company Commander, Cavalry Troop

Making a Positive Impression

Your personal conduct (and the conduct of individual Soldiers), along with the collective actions of your unit, will influence the attitudes of Iraqi nationals you encounter. Leaders must work diligently to make a positive impression for the good of the unit, your Soldiers, and the mission. Be polite, be professional, and be prepared to mend fences, if necessary, as you meet with local leaders and engage people on the street. Unless necessary, try not to appear threatening. Avoid presenting yourself or the U.S. Army as superior to Iraqis or Iraqi society. Be patient; it will take time for the Iraqis to accept and trust you.

(Note: GTA 24-01-003, Iraq Culture Smart Card, is included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

Iraqi Courtesy

Greetings: Greet people in the order of their seniority. Do not extend your hand to a female unless she extends her hand first. Learn to greet Iraqis in their language. These courtesies will earn the respect of Iraqis and relieve some of the tension of beginning a relationship.

Manners: Take a sincere interest in the person and his/her office. All first meetings with Iraqis will be consumed with them getting to know you and engaging in small talk rather than conducting any real business.

Eye contact: Maintain eye contact with the person you are addressing (do not look at your translator). Remove your sunglasses or goggles before speaking.
Refreshments: Iraqis typically offer refreshments (usually tea or coffee). Never accept the first offer; do accept by the third offer. At the conclusion of a long meeting, Iraqis will usually provide a snack or meal.

Time: Do not look at your watch, doing so suggests that the person you are meeting is not worthy of your time.

Obscenities: Most Iraqis are familiar with American obscenities (swear words and gestures). Do not use them and restrain Soldiers from using them in public. Using them in reference to an Iraqi is a great insult to the person (and maybe to his family/tribe).

**Iraqi Language**

It is very important to learn some words and phrases in the local language. If you can talk directly with the citizens, you can gather useful information. Citizens are the best source of information on the insurgent enemy living among them. Have your Soldiers learn basic phrases (see GTA 24-01-003, *Iraq Culture Smart Card*). Your military duty position requires interaction with Iraqi civilians, so press your chain of command for assistance with language training resources.

**Know what primary language is spoken in the area to which your unit is deploying.**

- About one-fifth of the Iraqi population who live in the area north of Baghdad speaks Kurdish.
- About three-fourths of the Iraqi population speaks Arabic.
- Iraqis also speak about 20 other Middle Eastern languages.

**Attempt to communicate with Iraqi military and civilian personnel using their language.**

- Do not worry about mispronunciation; everyone who attempts to speak a foreign language mispronounces words.
- Learn some words and phrases in the local language to assist in gathering information from the population.
- Your individual contribution to your unit’s success in Iraq will be much greater if you can learn a modest number of useful words and phrases in the local language.
Cultural Awareness

Most experts agree that Iraqis are more strongly influenced by their family, tribal, and religious affiliations than by their Iraqi national identity. Different locales in Iraq have distinct local cultural tendencies. Be aware of and make accommodations for these differences in your individual and unit activities.

Support to situational understanding

An official Army study has concluded that the individual Soldier is a leader’s best source of current information on cultural nuances, feelings, and perceptions that exist in the local community.

The Soldier on patrol in the local community is in far better position to observe and sense changes in his surroundings than the leadership positioned behind the barbed wire of the forward operations base. To sense change, Soldiers must have some understanding of what is normal. This cultural understanding is achieved formally by study and training and informally by spending time on the ground in the community.

When your Soldiers have a feel for what is normal in the neighborhood and can sense changes in the civilian population, they become important human sensors for collecting information. The reports that your Soldiers forward up through the platoon to the company enables you, the leader, to have situational awareness of the company area of operations (AO). When trained properly, your Soldiers can provide a detailed picture of the AO.

Six critical cultural factors have been identified that influence daily operations of units on the ground in Iraq:

- Naming conventions and transliterations:
  - Arabic names can contain up to five elements, each with a specific derivation: name given days after birth; honorific name (father or mother of someone); pedigree name (son or daughter of someone); descriptive name (usually, but not always, religious in origin); and by name, which can be derived from occupation, descent, or geography.
  - Several systems exist for converting Arabic into English (transliteration); consequently, one name in Arabic may appear in several English forms in the same database.
- Nonverbal cues during questioning: You must learn what gestures to use and what gestures not to use in the locale where your unit operates.
- Gaining personal respect: Facial hair, age, and knowledge of the Qur’an command respect and reverence in the Muslim world.
- Clerics and mosques as key cultural influences: Iraqi citizens are heavily influenced by their clerics (who may be called “imam” or “mullah”), who control activities at local mosques.
• Religious sect differences: The dominant fact of religious life in Iraq is the split between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims.

• Honoring the Arab culture: Honor is paramount in the Arab culture. Arabs think of honor in terms of “saving face” or “avoiding shame.”

Leaders must strive to understand the extremely complex society that is Iraq. Soldiers often will look at Iraqis and lump them all together into one image. Leaders must not let this happen.
Section III: Appendix

Cultural Operating Environment Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Important Local Knowledge for Tactical Leaders

People’s attitude

• What are the local peoples’ basic assumptions about life? Is the world hostile? Whom do they regard as threats? How can threats be handled? What are their chances of achieving their goals?

• What are the people in your local area willing to die for?

• Who are the “protectors” (armed citizens, clan or religious militia, police, and army) for the basic social unit (family, clan, tribe)?

• Do the locals trust the police? Local military? U.S. forces? Local government?

Information operations

• How do the people of your local area get their information or news? Which sources have credibility among the local people? How do rumors start and spread? What is the feedback loop that informs you about what the people are really thinking and saying?

• What is the most credible source of news/information for the people? Do local elites value a different source?

Economic influences

• How do people earn their living in your local area?

• What is the primary legal industry (agriculture, manufacturing)?

• What percentage of the people are unemployed? Is unemployment a significant problem?

• How, when, and where do the people buy, sell, or acquire goods and services, especially essentials such as food, water, fuel, medicine and medical care, clothes, seed, livestock, building materials, vehicles, and vehicle repairs?

• Do people have difficulty acquiring the necessities: water, food, shelter, and clothing?
Social and religious influences

- What is the basic social structure of your local AO? Is the prime unit the family, clan, tribe, neighborhood, village, political party, religious congregation, or a combination of these?

- Who holds the social, political, economic, and religious leadership in your local area? Do they have an armed following?

- What is the religious affiliation of the local people in your area?

- To what extent are the local people in your area influenced by religion in daily life?

- What are the dynamics and structure of the local religious leadership?

- Do the people in your local area have loyalties, dependencies, or connections (family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, religious sect) that cross outside the boundaries of your AO?

- Are there cultural, religious, or ethnic divisions in your AO? What are the points of friction between the groups?

- What are the points of social etiquette and customs that can either enhance or harm your acceptability and effectiveness with locals?

Criminal activities

- What illegal activities provide significant income (smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnaping, robbery/banditry, black marketeering)?

- Which of the illegal activities are considered socially acceptable, tolerable, or are habitually overlooked by law enforcement?

- What are the patterns of influence and corruption? What services require payment of bribes, and what official receives them?
Section IV: Combat Lifesaver (CLS)

“First aid and CLS was force-fed to all of our Soldiers. It was frustrating and annoying going through the training, but it all paid exponential dividends. I took my first casualty our second day in Iraq. The Soldier lost five pints of blood. He and the two other Soldiers who helped treat his amputated leg were able to keep him alive due to the high level of medical training that they received.”

Staff Sergeant, Infantry Team Leader

“Train as many CLS and combat medics as possible. Go beyond the quota; this will aid you eight months into the tour when attritions and leave is high. Plus, the more you have will aid in physical security. Have a CLS bag in every vehicle and a big combat medic bag in the command and control vehicle or the aid and litter vehicles.”

1st Lieutenant, Platoon Leader, Field Artillery

“The standard was one CLS per vehicle if possible with at least a medic for 12 or more vehicles. Predesignate landing zones and brief the MEDEVAC plan.”

Captain, Platoon Leader, Cavalry Squadron

There is no doubt that the presence of CLS-trained Soldiers in small units is saving lives. It is the responsibility of every leader to see that his unit gets CLS training for Soldiers, including the routine refresher training for those who are already CLS qualified.

Seventy-three percent of small-unit veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom agreed that CLS training is making a substantial difference in the survival of wounded Soldiers. Train a sufficient number of Soldiers to have at least one per team/crew.

Emergency medical technician (EMT) (or first responder) training is the next step above CLS. When possible, train select Soldiers as EMTs. They can augment your organic medics in severe situations. One medic and one EMT per platoon, on a combat mission, is a good planning factor.

Equip every vehicle and squad with a CLS medical supply bag. If not covered by your higher command, include inspecting the contents of the CLS bag in your unit standing operating procedures. Inspect CLS bags regularly as part of precombat inspections.

Combat Lifesaver Correspondence Course

The U.S. Army Institute for Professional Development (AIPD) offers the Combat Lifesaver Course as a self-study correspondence course, ISO871. The instruction includes information needed to complete successfully the written, written performance, and performance examinations for the combat lifesaver certification and recertification. The material is for information only and does not include instructor materials. It is part of the Combat Lifesaver Course, which is taught in
group study mode. Leaders must enroll their Soldiers in accordance with Army Regulation 350-1 in order to receive credit for the course.

Further information is available by contacting AIPD:

Army Institute for Professional Development
ATTN: ATIC-ISD (dl Student Support Team)
U.S. Army Training Support Center
Newport News, VA 23628-0001

Telephone: DSN 826-3335/3322; COM (757) 878-3335/3322
Chapter 3

Knowledge

Section I: Relief in Place (RIP)/Transfer of Authority (TOA)

“A month’s worth of ride-along patrols with both U.S. and Iraqi forces gave us a strong idea of what we were dealing with, as well as providing a basis of a strong intelligence network.”

Sergeant, Squad Leader

“Taught us their patrol TTP, familiarized us with Baghdad; trained us on FBCB2.”

1st Lieutenant, Platoon Leader, Combat Arms

“The unit we replaced did a great job of helping us out. We learned the battle drills, TTP, SOPs, and mission process we apply now.”

1st Lieutenant, Platoon Leader, Combat Service Support

The process of conducting the RIP/TOA can make or break the first 100 days of the rotation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. An effective RIP/TOA means that your unit is ready and capable of taking on the mission of the previous unit. Make the best use of the time you spend with the outgoing unit. Quickly work your Soldiers into the daily operations of the outgoing unit. Do right-seat/left-seat patrols. Include Iraqi units, if that is part of the force/mission in the area of operations (AO) you are inheriting. During this initial period, concentrate on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and standing operating procedures (SOPs) that are working and adapt them to your unit. Get comfortable with the outgoing unit’s TTP. When you can, left-seat/right-seat every Soldier in your unit with his outgoing counterpart.

The outgoing leadership should introduce your unit leadership to the Iraqis they have dealt with on a routine basis. This introduction helps avoid breaks in the intelligence networks developed by the outgoing unit and will reduce the time it takes for Iraqi citizens to trust your unit.

RIP/TOA should provide the following information:

• Knowledge on the enemy in your area
• Likely places for improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and the attack methods used
• Likely enemy tactics, movements, and operations in the AO
• Areas prone to frequent insurgent attacks
• Relationship of map to ground (terrain, city streets, neighborhoods)
• Existing intelligence sources and networks in place
• Whom your unit leadership should know and trust locally
• Lessons learned from recent operations and missions

Problematic RIP/TOA

If you, or any part of the company leadership, detect any of the signs below, take steps immediately through your chain of command to correct the situation. In some cases, there is little you or your unit can do to correct the shortcomings of the unit you are replacing. In this case, you may need to consult with other platoons/companies to help fill in the gaps. If the RIP is ineffective, take extra precautions in the first days for security and force protection (FP). Also, be sensitive to the relationship the outgoing unit had with the local population and local Iraqi forces. Your unit may need to do some “fence mending” to regain their trust.

Signs of potentially ineffective RIP/TOA:

• Outgoing unit has inadequate or out-of-date information on enemy activity.

• Outgoing unit does not use local knowledge sources appropriately (or sources are keyed to bits of information not of tactical value).

• Outgoing leaders and Soldiers are primed on going home rather than completing an effective RIP process.

• The process is rushed or allocated insufficient time to complete.

• Outgoing unit is tactically ineffective, functionally inept, or uses ineffective TTP.

RIP/TOA Guides

Use the guides included here to help plan and conduct your RIP/TOA. When planning the RIP/TOA, read and adhere to the SOPs of your headquarters and their next higher headquarters. If it is available, get a copy of the guide the outbound unit used to conduct its RIP. It should suggest areas you must include in the transition. These guides will assist you in putting together an effective RIP, ensuring that you and your Soldiers are ready to take charge of the mission at the TOA. Use them to preload tasks and establish task-conditions-standards for the RIP areas concerned.

During right-seat/left-seat rides, split the time available for RIP equally. Right seat leads, left seat observes. Observe the outgoing unit during the first half of the ride, then switch seats midway through the process.
Operational overview briefs

Conditions:

☐ Both units have copies of existing written guidance and policy letters

☐ Operational/tactical maps of the area

☐ Additional unit briefs as required

Measures of effectiveness (MOE):

☐ Outgoing unit conducts operational overview brief to incoming unit members.

☐ Outgoing unit gives an overview of the types of missions and roles performed to the incoming unit.

☐ Outgoing unit outlines formal and informal chain of command arrangements.

☐ Outgoing unit highlights location and contact numbers (if known) for other U.S. and coalition units operating within the area.

☐ Outgoing unit highlights location and contact numbers (if known) for other U.S. and coalition non-military agencies operating within the area.

☐ Copies of all briefings, operations orders, and fragmentary orders are provided to incoming unit leaders.

☐ Incoming unit members complete question-and-answer period with outgoing unit members following all briefings.

Standard: At TOA, incoming unit is oriented on all aspects of current operations within the area.
AO orientation and reconnaissance

Conditions:

☐ Outgoing unit AO RIP/TOA reconnaissance plan

☐ Required maps and photographs

☐ Unit vehicles

MOE:

☐ Incoming unit receives operational overview brief from outgoing unit prior to reconnaissance of the AO.

☐ Outgoing and incoming unit execute reconnaissance of key terrain and key infrastructure facilities within the AO.

☐ Incoming unit understands location of division, brigade, and battalion boundaries for U.S. and coalition units within the AO.

☐ Incoming unit possesses situational awareness (SA) and understanding of key terrain, key infrastructure facilities, and religious sites located within the AO.

☐ Outgoing unit lists the prominent local nationals (known political, religious, police, and military leaders) within the AO who are friendly to U.S. and coalition forces (CF). Outgoing unit introduces incoming unit to prominent local nationals when and where possible.

☐ Outgoing unit provides a list of points of contact and phone numbers for the local sheiks, mullahs, and imams.

☐ Outgoing unit lists local nationals who are suspected of directly supporting anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) within the AO.

Standard: At TOA, incoming unit members have conducted a reconnaissance of key terrain, key infrastructure facilities, and key local nationals within the AO.
Conduct SOP battle rhythm integration

Conditions:

- Unit tactical SOP
- Other appropriate SOPs
- Outgoing unit TTP

MOE:

- Outgoing unit executes formal and informal SOP orientation brief to incoming unit members.
- Incoming unit personnel study SOP requirements during the “left-seat” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming unit personnel understand and implement SOP requirements during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming unit members adapt learned unit TTP and refine the incoming unit’s battle rhythm during the “left-seat” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming unit reviews and emulates the outgoing unit’s reporting process during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming unit leaders incorporate battle rhythm TTP, as appropriate, during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming unit leaders review and shadow the outgoing unit’s standard meeting schedules and incorporate them, as appropriate, into their battle rhythm during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.
- Knowledge of friendly situation, including locations and actions of active combat patrols and combat logistics patrols within the AO.

Standard: Incoming unit has established a battle rhythm and, where applicable, has incorporated the outgoing unit’s battle rhythm TTP.
TTP and battle drills

Conditions:

- Unit SOP
- Unit vehicles
- Unit basic load
- Communications equipment

MOE:

- Outgoing unit briefs tactical TTP and battle drills used and refined over the length of their tour, to include:
  - Vehicle load plans.
  - Preset communications equipment frequencies.
  - Monitoring different communications nets while mounted and dismounted.
  - Vehicle security while dismounted.
  - Observation plan while mounted and dismounted.
  - Damaged vehicle security and recovery.
  - Landing zone security in event of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).
  - Overwatch of discovered or suspected IEDs.
  - Receiving reports and battle tracking while mounted and dismounted.
  - Reporting to battalion and brigade unit tactical operations centers during operations.

- Incoming unit observes the execution of unit TTP and battle drills by the outgoing unit during the “left-seat” portion of RIP.

- Incoming unit incorporates and further refines learned unit TTP and battle drills during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.

Standard: Incoming unit understands the employment of tactical unit TTP and battle drills utilized by the outgoing unit over the length of the tour.
AO intelligence review

Conditions:

- Significant activities (past 30 days)
- Operations map
- Historical files

MOE:

- Outgoing unit briefs AIF activity in AO during past 30 days.
- Incoming unit understands predominant AIF TTP used within the AO.
- Outgoing unit briefs groups, affiliations, and persons of interest suspected of involvement in AIF activity.
- Incoming unit understands location of all IED high-activity areas within the AO.
- Incoming unit observes reporting and tracking of AIF activity in the AO by the outgoing unit during the “left-seat” portion of the RIP and implements those methods during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.

Standard: At TOA, the incoming unit has situational understanding of AIF activity within the AO during past 30 days.
Translators

Conditions:

- Unit translator
- Applicable SOPs

MOE:

- Outgoing unit briefs translator support, including:
  - Battle rhythm.
  - Means of contacting translator when he is off duty.
  - FP considerations.
  - TTP for successful use of translators.
  - Unit obligations for translator life support.
  - Guidelines for translator exposure to classified information.
  - Other associated administrative requirements.

- Incoming team observes employment of translator during the “left-seat” portion of the RIP.

- Incoming team incorporates learned TTP for employing translators during the “right-seat” portion of the RIP.

Standard: Incoming unit understands the following:

- TTP for successful use of translator
- Translator’s battle rhythm
- FP measures in place to safeguard translator during mission execution
Conduct property inventories

Conditions:

☐ Organizational property hand receipts and shortage annexes on hand

☐ Applicable technical manuals

MOE:

☐ Outgoing unit has all identified shortages on a valid requisition and provides the document numbers to the incoming unit.

☐ Both units conducting the inventory have copies of the hand receipts and shortage annexes prior to beginning the inventory.

☐ Outgoing unit lays out 100 percent of the equipment being inventoried by the team prior to beginning of inventory.

☐ Incoming and outgoing units complete a joint inventory of all equipment (by serial number where applicable).

☐ Outgoing unit initiates reports of the survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.

☐ Incoming unit verifies and signs installation and organizational hand receipts and takes physical possession of all equipment.

☐ Incoming unit submits hand receipt paperwork to property book officer (PBO) in sector, in accordance with applicable policy directives.

Standard: Prior to TOA, the incoming unit has conducted a 100-percent inventory, which is accounted for (by serial number where required) and signed for. This inventory possesses 100 percent of all designated stay-behind equipment (SBE) with valid shortage annexes and valid requisitions for missing items.
Conduct physical property transfer of SBE (uparmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles and theater-provided equipment)

Conditions:

☐ Installation and organizational property hand receipt and shortage annexes

☐ Applicable technical manuals

MOE:

☐ Outgoing unit has all identified shortages on a valid requisition and provides the document numbers to the incoming unit.

☐ Both units conducting the inventory have copies of the hand receipts and shortage annexes prior to beginning the inventory.

☐ Outgoing unit lays out 100 percent of the equipment (including components of the end item) being inventoried prior to beginning of inventory.

☐ Incoming and outgoing units complete a joint inventory of all equipment, by serial number where applicable.

☐ Both units verify serial numbers of all sensitive items and submit a report to the S-1.

☐ Outgoing unit initiates reports of the survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.

☐ Incoming unit verifies and signs installation and organizational hand receipt and takes physical possession of all SBE.

Standard: Prior to TOA, the incoming unit has conducted a 100-percent inventory, which is accounted for (by serial number where required) and signed for. This inventory possesses 100 percent of all designated SBE with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
Conduct installation property transfer

Conditions:

- Installation property hand receipt
- Applicable operating or technical manuals
- Shortage annexes

MOE:

- Outgoing unit provides the incoming unit with any owner’s manuals or product component listing for off-the-shelf items.
- Outgoing unit personnel have laid out or have identified the location (if item can not be disconnected) of 100 percent of the equipment prior to the inventory.
- Both the incoming and outgoing units complete the joint inventory of all equipment by serial number where applicable.
- Outgoing unit initiates reports of the survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.
- Incoming unit verifies and signs installation hand receipt, provides copies to installation PBO in sector, and takes physical possession of all installation property.

Standard: Prior to TOA, the incoming unit has conducted a 100-percent inventory, which is accounted for (by serial number where required) and signed for. This inventory possesses 100 percent of all installation property with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
Maintenance program

Conditions:

- Appropriate technical manuals
- DA Form 5988-E, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet

MOE:

- Outgoing and incoming units conduct joint preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).
- Outgoing unit briefs the process for maintenance and repair above operator level and current vehicle services data.
- Outgoing unit conducts an orientation visit to external maintenance facilities (contract maintenance support or U.S. unit maintenance collection point).
- Incoming unit establishes necessary maintenance accounts and verifies equipment in unit-level logistics system (ground).
- Incoming unit understands how to contact maintenance recovery crews.
- Incoming unit receives points of contact for scheduling maintenance repair to vehicles, radios, and weapons.
- Outgoing unit briefs service data for all ancillary equipment (weapons, communications equipment, and night-vision goggles).
- Incoming unit understands the method of reporting battle losses and requisitioning replacement equipment.
- Incoming unit assumes the maintenance mission.

Standard: Prior to TOA, the incoming unit has conducted a 100-percent inventory, which accounted for (by serial number where required) and signed for. This inventory possesses 100 percent of all installation property with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
Section II: Intelligence

“Soldiers must understand what is normal in everyday life. This understanding will better enable them to distinguish dangerous situations from normal situations.”

**Sergeant First Class, Scout Platoon Sergeant**

“I expected my S-2 to provide me with perfect intelligence. This was an unrealistic expectation. All of the actionable intelligence that I received came from my Soldiers talking to locals on the ground in my AO. Don’t trust information from a source unless you know him and have developed a relationship over time.”

**Captain, Cavalry Troop Commander**

“The only good intelligence you will ever get is the intelligence your sergeants and lieutenants develop while on the ground in your sector. This is a company-level fight. No matter how hard brigade and division want to fight it, you must get your own intelligence.”

**Captain, Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander, Brigade Combat Team**

In the contemporary operating environment, the Army uses many high-tech systems to collect information about the enemy. Information sensors include satellites, special high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, ground-mounted radars, cameras, and listening devices. These technical means gather information by photographing the enemy and terrain, listening to enemy voice and digital communications, and capturing other types of raw intelligence data. Specialists in each intelligence discipline collect and analyze this data to build a picture of enemy capabilities and sometimes predict enemy actions.

In a counterinsurgency (COIN) operating environment, the very nature of the enemy dilutes the capacity of many of these technical means. Insurgents use the cover of everyday life and the people to mask their activity. Therefore, these high-tech means for intelligence collection give way to basic human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

**Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2)**

Basic HUMINT collection is the business of every Soldier who walks a patrol, moves in a convoy, or occupies a checkpoint. Every Soldier, regardless of his military occupational specialty or duty position, has a part to play in gathering information for use by intelligence analysts. This is the essence of the concept “Every Soldier is a Sensor,” commonly referred to as ES2.
Every leader should constantly reinforce the ES2 concept with his Soldiers. As part of your ES2 training, require Soldiers to be competent in techniques for gaining SA within the AO:

Know the local area
- What is normal for the local community, markets, streets, and transportation patterns?
- Are any areas prone to frequent insurgent attacks?

Get to know the locals
- Spend time getting to know local citizens who live in the villages and community; who belongs and who does not?
- Who can you talk to and trust? Ask your counterpart to introduce you.

Gain the trust of local citizens
- Simple manners and courtesy go a long way.
- Humanize yourself to the local citizens; shake hands and smile.
- When you give respect, you get respect. Being respectful can help you gather useful information.
- Not every Iraqi is out to kill you; helping them will help you.
- Kids are often more receptive than the adults; use this to your advantage.

Know your surroundings:
- Generally, women and children in a car indicate that a vehicle-borne IED attack is less likely.
- Generally, the presence of children playing in the street means an IED attack is less likely in that area.
- Watch for signs and signals that might indicate something is wrong (e.g., a usually busy area empty of people may indicate a potential attack).

What should you train Soldiers to look for?
What to look for depends on several factors, so train Soldiers to look for anything out of the ordinary. As members of your unit come to understand the daily or nightly rhythms of life around them, they will develop a sixth sense about what is “normal” and what is not. Encourage Soldiers to trust their sixth sense to alert them to misplaced people or objects and irregular patterns of activity.

Train Soldiers to keep in mind the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) while patrolling an area. In simple terms, PIR are “be on the lookout” (BOLO) items. It could be specific people, vehicles of a certain description or type, particular items
of weaponry or equipment, or patterns of behavior. Whatever it is, before each mission, tell Soldiers exactly what to look for.

(Note: GTA 30-02-001, *A Soldier’s Guide to Direct Questioning, Reporting, and Detainee Operations (ES2)*, is included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

**Company Intelligence**

Soldiers on patrols and convoys are the best collectors of intelligence for the company leadership. Companies need a mechanism for recording this information, analyzing it for actionable items, and getting it to higher headquarters. Designate a primary intelligence officer (company executive officer, tactical operations center [TOC] officer [typically a lieutenant waiting for a platoon], noncommissioned officer [NCO], or a small group of officers/NCOs). Before deployment, be sure the intelligence officer (section) understands some basic intelligence functions: battle tracking, pattern analysis, and debriefing. Connect the intelligence officer with the battalion S-2 and work the links beforehand.

**Patrol Reports**

Reporting can occur in a number of ways, some immediate and some after the fact. Soldiers should understand and recognize what to bring to their leader’s immediate attention and what can be reported later. The basic SALUTE (size, activity, location, uniform, time, and equipment) report is still the standard.

Every mission is a source of information. If a unit (especially at the company level) does not have an efficient information gathering and analysis system, the intelligence gathered by each patrol can be lost. Every mission should end with a written “patrol report.” Patrol leaders and convoy commanders are responsible for preparing this report. Have every Soldier write down a detailed account of the patrol: the people, places, and events. Tell Soldiers to be concise, but not to skip details. This procedure allows you to document every aspect of the mission, not only for further analysis, but also for historical archives. Once the information is collected from the patrol members and the patrol report is written, conduct a patrol debrief that covers the following topics:

- Operational reconnaissance
- Social/political reconnaissance
- Humanitarian reconnaissance
- Historical reconnaissance
- Assessment of the mission
- Company PIR

The troop executive officer or the TOC officer should read every patrol debrief and extract information/intelligence that needs additional follow-up. Follow-up items may include changes in enemy TTP, enemy trends, changes in local attitudes or behaviors or moods, and changes or new obstacles along routes. Leaders should
cross-check reports from multiple patrols to establish the reliability of information items. This information becomes the troop PIR and drives the planning for future missions.

Following the patrol leader debrief, pass information up to the next level headquarters. Compare your information with the information being analyzed by the intelligence staff (S-2) of battalion/brigade in order to build company-level SA. Take the current intelligence you get from the S-2 (or other sources) and pass to each Soldier. Before each mission, brief every Soldier on the most critical intelligence requirements, watch lists, BOLO lists, and enemy activity.

Using Translators

Translators are a huge combat multiplier in a COIN fight. A good translator may mean the difference between a successful mission and a fiasco. The language barrier is already a limitation when working with the local population. If your translator cannot translate what you mean, your message will not be effective. Build a relationship with your translator. Stress the importance of translating what you say verbatim. Make sure the translator knows he cannot summarize and must convey the full meaning of your message. Watch your translator’s body language to determine if he understands the message. If the translator appears to be confused, reword the message until he can translate it accurately. Break your message down into simple sentences and do not use big words.

Translators are also a source of intelligence. Query them on what they saw when you were in contact with the locals. Was there any difference between what local civilians said and what they meant? What did the translator hear in side conversations that went on while you were there?

Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE)

Destroying the planner, financier, and bomb maker who support the insurgency is an essential part of preempting insurgent attacks. This demands heightened Soldier awareness while conducting operations. Soldiers must know how to effectively search an objective and question personnel in a way that yields information that leads to the defeat of the insurgent infrastructure.

TSE concepts ensure that Soldiers can effectively conduct a search of an area, question personnel, and quickly assess the information collected in order to target and prosecute insurgents. TSE consists of the actions taken to ensure that documents, materiel, and personnel are identified, collected, protected, and evaluated in order to facilitate follow-on actions. TSE is part of all search operations, but extends well beyond the search to exploit information and evidence identified on a search site.

(Note: GTA 90-01-008, Tactical Site Exploitation, is included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

Company- and platoon-level TSE

- The team that conducts the operation evaluates the situation and determines whether to perform expedient or formal site exploitation, execute screening, or question detainees.
• Soldiers must properly collect and catalog information/evidence they encounter and take sworn statements for entry into the host nation’s legal system.

• Using evidence kits, Soldiers on site must document the collection effort with photos of people, materiel, and other items of potential intelligence or legal interest.

The platoon or company leader determines the need for formal TSE. In conducting a formal TSE, small units might have the assistance or direct support of specialized teams, such as the following:

• Document and materiel exploitation teams
• Biometrics data collection teams
• Forensic collection teams
• Search and evidence custody teams
• Detainee support teams
• HUMINT exploitation teams

TSE requires you (and your Soldiers) to change your conventional mindset. When security permits, your unit must transition to a detail-oriented collection process in order to gain information that ultimately will aid in defeating the threat activity. Soldiers on the ground must develop the skill to identify what constitutes evidence and intelligence and react accordingly.

There are three primary purposes for conducting TSE:

• Answer information requirements: Every Soldier can make an observation that answers information requirements the commander needs to develop SA and drive planning and execution.

• Facilitate subsequent operations: The information gained from TSE can lead to immediate follow-on actions on or near the objective. The information may require detailed analysis that precipitates a follow-on operation.

• Facilitate host nation criminal prosecution: TSE is vital to the prosecution and conviction of insurgents in a legitimate legal process. Commanders and Soldiers must consider the local requirements for prosecution when collecting evidence during TSE.
Section III: Rules of Engagement (ROE)/Escalation of Force (EOF)

“Walk-through of rules of engagement revealed several instances that did not work as well in practice as in theory. We modified those and made Soldiers think it out for themselves so they all fully grasped the situation.”

1st Lieutenant, Platoon Leader

“Rules of engagement were too ‘tight.’ At times, Soldiers would not return fire on enemy for fear of punishment, even when civilians were not in the area.”

Private First Class, Infantryman

ROE are orders issued by a commander that tell you when, under what circumstances, and by what methods you can use force. ROE cannot be modified by lower-level commands. Leaders and Soldiers need to train and execute to the established ROE standards during actual operations. ROE apply to you and to units with crew-served weapons, such as machine guns, tanks, artillery, or attack helicopters. ROE violations may be prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Importance of ROE

- ROE reinforce the laws of war.
- ROE prevent you from violating the laws of war, international law, and U.S. law.
- ROE minimize injury to civilians and damage to civilian property.

ROE Terminology

Hostile forces

A declared hostile force can be any person, paramilitary force, uniformed military force, or terrorist(s) declared hostile by an appropriate U.S. authority.

In certain circumstances, your unit may be defending non-U.S. citizens, military forces, or property (as currently in Iraq and Afghanistan). The President or the Secretary of Defense may authorize the right of collective self-defense to your unit, entitling them to engage hostile forces threatening the safety of non-U.S. citizens, military forces, or property.

Once a force is declared to be “hostile,” your unit may engage it without first observing a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Unless declared hostile forces are in the act of surrendering or out of combat due to sickness or battle wounds, they may be engaged on sight.
Hostile acts, hostile intent, and imminent use of force

A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against the United States and U.S. forces. In some cases, this definition is expanded to include a hostile act or attack on U.S. nationals, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and even designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and their property (as currently in Iraq or Afghanistan). A hostile act triggers the right to use proportional force in self-defense to deter, neutralize, or destroy the threat.

Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. forces, or other designated persons and property. When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use proportional force in self-defense to deter, neutralize, or destroy the threat.

Imminent use of force does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous. For example, discovering an insurgent planting an IED may constitute an imminent threat, even though the insurgent does not intend to detonate the IED immediately. The determination of whether the use of force against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on a review of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time and may be made at any level.

Escalation of Force

EOF procedures are a subcomponent of the ROE. EOF procedures prescribe employing lesser nonlethal methods of force, if employing those measures will achieve the desired effect without endangering the Soldier or others. EOF procedures are common in COIN operational environments, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where enemy forces use civilians and CF to mask their presence. The intent of EOF is to reduce the potential for unintended casualties that result from using lethal means as a first resort. When conditions permit, Soldiers should use nonlethal means, such as visible or audible warnings, demonstration of their weapons, blocking access, physically detaining a person, firing a warning shot, and/or firing a disabling shot at a vehicle to gain compliance. EOF is not a substitute for ROE—it is a part or component of the ROE.

Units often provide Soldiers with pocket-sized cards containing ROE and EOF procedures. These cards are very helpful for studying and learning the rules. However, your Soldiers should not rely on these cards at a critical moment. You and your Soldiers must understand the critical aspects of successful EOF:

- Early warning for people approaching a CF position
- Clear intent of what people approaching a CF position must do to avoid the use of force
- Clear triggers for escalating force from nonlethal to lethal based on the ROE

Once you understand the critical aspects of successful EOF, you should set conditions for success for your Soldiers through training and reinforcing standards for EOF-related TTP. Leaders must ensure that Soldiers deploying to theaters of operation where ROE are in force undergo intensive training that contains ROE and EOF scenarios.
Many Soldiers see ROE and EOF as unwarranted restrictions on their actions in a fight and feel that complying with ROE restricts their right to defend themselves. You can help remove Soldiers’ fears by educating and reinforcing the importance of ROE and EOF procedures. ROE and EOF enhance FP and aid mission accomplishment. Provide required resources (such as FP equipment and traffic control point kits from the Rapid Equipping Force) to facilitate EOF-related training scenarios. These scenarios protect Soldiers and empower them to make the appropriate EOF decision during actual operations. Training EOF procedures helps Soldiers recognize conditions where the use of nonlethal means may de-escalate potentially threatening situations.

Soldiers should not fear informal or formal investigations for possible violations of ROE and EOF procedures. The overriding purpose of these investigations is to establish the facts of each individual case and to determine if the Soldier or unit involved applied the ROE and EOF procedures as intended. Most investigations result in a determination that a Soldier or unit acted properly.

The Soldier’s right to self-defense

ROE always contain provisions that permit units and Soldiers to use force in self-defense. When confronted with hostile intent or when a hostile act occurs, use of force in self-defense is authorized for as long as the hostile intent or hostile acts continue. The use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to the demonstration of hostile intent or hostile acts. The action or response must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on the totality of circumstances (proportionality).

Training ROE and EOF

Practice in the application of ROE and EOF procedures starts during predeployment training; make it rigorous, realistic, and innovative. Results of well-thought-out EOF integrated training will help prepare your Soldiers for the complex challenges they will face in COIN operations. Constant practice is the key to a Soldier’s ability to recognize a situation and the appropriate ROE.

Constantly review the ROE and EOF procedures with your Soldiers. Know and rehearse the ROE and EOF procedures using sample scenarios before every mission. Develop contingencies, even for the routine missions. Detailed and innovative planning and strong troop-leading procedures (TLP) can extend the reaction time your Soldiers need to de-escalate potentially volatile engagements. Incorporate lethal and nonlethal means into mission planning and weigh and adjust the follow-on effects during execution. Employing available FP equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure to increase a Soldier’s reaction time in potential EOF events.

EOF mission planning

Leaders at all levels should strive to maintain situational understanding of their AO and area of responsibility (AOR). You gain and maintain situational understanding by leveraging information gathered from higher, lower, and adjacent units using digital and analog communications. Other means of gathering information include maps, intelligence summaries, situation reports, and engaging the local population.
The eight steps of TLP are the framework for small-unit EOF mission planning considerations:

☐ Receive mission: Consider the ROE/EOF implications.

☐ Issue warning order: Allocate time available to integrate EOF-related procedures into training preparation, including precombat checks (PCC), precombat inspections (PCI), rehearsals, and movement.

☐ Make a tentative plan:
  - Assess your training, equipment, and FP capabilities (including nonlethal means) to counter threats.
  - Consider current and review past EOF incidents and locations in your AO/AOR.
  - Determine/assess if the civilian population is pro-CF, anti-CF, or neutral.
  - Incorporate enemy pattern analysis into EOF planning.
  - Consider enemy composition, disposition, strength, recent activities, ability to reinforce, and possible courses of action, including using civilians as cover.
  - Assess enemy size, capabilities, and potential tactics within and outside the AO.

☐ Initiate movement: Be prepared to execute preplanned and rehearsed ROE/EOF procedures, including the effects of integrating enablers: fire support, explosive ordnance disposal, attack aviation, quick reaction force (QRF), MEDEVAC, and FP equipment.

☐ Reconnoiter: Consider civil considerations that can affect ROE/EOF:
  - Areas: urban or rural
  - Structures: built-up, battle-damaged, religious, etc.
  - Local population disposition
  - Local leaders’ (tribal, religious, and civic) allegiance to CF and influence on local population

☐ Complete plan: Provide clear ROE/EOF guidance in commander’s intent and develop contingencies that adapt to changing battlefield conditions. Include information operations to get your message out in order to mitigate possible misunderstandings of events and de-escalate possible volatile situations.

☐ Issue operations order:
  - Include mission, risk management/safety considerations, and current ROE/EOF policies/procedures.
• Adjust the plan based on updated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; troops-to-tasks; and available FP equipment.

• Make final coordination with adjacent units, ready-reaction forces, and higher headquarters prior to issuing the order.

• Conduct an updated combined mission, safety, and ROE/EOF briefing, and back brief to commander/designated representative.

☐ Supervise: Keep higher headquarters command post (CP) informed of the unit’s status, tactical situation, and FP posture. Ensure Soldiers enforce ROE/EOF procedures during operations and report incidents.

Each EOF incident is unique and requires assessment. The lives of your Soldiers and innocent civilians depend on your ability to ready your unit to mentally and physically deal with each conceivable EOF situation that may arise. The mission comes first; however, judicious use of force is a proven combat multiplier supporting mission accomplishment. Lack of forethought to include EOF-integrated scenarios during training may result in unnecessary casualties in operations. Effective EOF integration into predeployment training, mission planning, and execution reinforces CF FP, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success.
Section IV: Pre-Mission Checks

“Train to standard in the small things, have PCC/PCI checklists, everyone should know how to operate the GPS, SINCGARS, and all weapons systems.”

Staff Sergeant, Scout Team Leader

“Do the right thing every time. Do not take shortcuts. Do your PMCS on all equipment by the book each time. Ensure precombat checks are conducted before each mission, [and a] leader’s recon is conducted. If the hair on your neck is not standing on end like the first time you left the wire you are wrong!”

Sergeant First Class, Platoon Sergeant, Armored Cavalry Troop

Precombat Checks (PCC) and Precombat Inspections (PCI)

PCC are detailed checks of personnel and equipment for mission readiness. First-line leaders (NCOs) conduct PCC as part of recovery and reset between missions and operations.

PCI are conducted immediately before a unit starts a mission (e.g., checking individual gear, setting radio frequencies, distributing ammunition, and checking weapons). Intermediate leaders (platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and patrol leader) and company leaders (commander, executive officer, and first sergeant) conduct PCI as part of TLP.

Unit SOP, technical manuals, and operator’s manuals will cover “how-to” when conducting PCC. Check your company SOP for what items are checked, who does the checking, and when they are checked.

Commanders must allocate sufficient time for subordinate leaders to execute PCC and PCI to standard. PCI validate that the PCC have been performed. Include time for corrective actions should an individual or item fail the inspection. Do not shortchange PCC and PCI; do these to standard every time. Disciplined PCC and PCI not only readies Soldiers for “going outside the wire,” it also helps fight the complacency that sets in with repeated missions.

Leaders, do not delegate this responsibility; you must be the inspector. You must be competent in the operation, care, and maintenance of the unit’s weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and any other mission-essential equipment. You must also be familiar with the key duty positions and critical jobs within the unit.

The following tables provide sample checklists to assist the small-unit leader in conducting PCC and to assist the company leaders in conducting PCI.
### Individual Soldier PCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) individual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equipment serviceable (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and support available, and time available)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective mask with carrier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical inserts (if required)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-fogging kit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical cover</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual weapon with night-vision equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night-vision equipment with spare batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective clothing (protective eyewear, kneepads, elbow pads,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interceptor Body Armor System with small-arms protective inserts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) implemented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashlight with filters and batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification card</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver’s license</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge and password confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Individual Soldier PCI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Load-bearing equipment/modular lightweight load-carrying equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MOLLE) complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat lifesaver bag complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ear plugs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen/hydration system full with M17 drinking cap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevlar helmet with camouflage cover and band</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons zero</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (with battle roster)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA Form 1155, Witness Statement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flak vest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashlight with filters and batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification tags around neck</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle PCC</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) performed/dispatched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topped off</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load plan present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, oil, and lubricant packaged products (including weapon oil)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water can full</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals, ready to eat, rations stowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons cleaning kits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator’s vehicle maintenance (OVM) items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic issue items present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First aid kits complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools and tool kits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–4 quarts of DS-2 per vehicle present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goggles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior clean and orderly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle PCI</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verify DA Form 5988-E, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load according to load plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVM clean and serviceable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify inspection date</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire extinguishers tagged and updated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Weapons Systems PCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons annotated with battle sight zero</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCS completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test fire weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range cards on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition basic load present and stowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons cleaning kits on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Weapons Systems PCI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verify zero with Soldiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify DA Form 5988-E, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify weapons clearing procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Communications Systems PCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure radio checks made on all voice and digital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCS completed for each radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antennas and mounts serviceable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE-254 and field expedient antennas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal operating instructions on hand in accordance with tactical SOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic load of batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ BA5600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ BA5800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ BA5590</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Size AA batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Size D batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Size 9-volt batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Hub batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External battery box present and serviceable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-jam plan (jump frequency sets on radios)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscriber table on hand (digital tactical SOP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand microphones and spares on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLARS) filled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet controller (INC) filled in radio transmitter mounts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical manuals on hand for communication equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Communications Systems PCI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verify all radios are operational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify DA Form 5988-E, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLARS operational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Systems PCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perform required PMCS (see operator’s manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear logs and queues at least daily; sooner if processing speed becomes noticeably reduced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify equipment operational status/ability to send and receive situational awareness (SA) and command and control (C2) messages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and verify message groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and verify default message addresses for each message type, particularly MAYDAY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify correct SOP SA filter settings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish user-defined locations/Tactical Information Retrieval System (TIRS) to facilitate map navigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify correct map data load (Compressed ARC Digitized Raster Graphics/imagery/Digital Terrain Elevation Data)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify mission data load (overlays/TIRS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify message folders/filing system established by SOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build and save position reports for subordinate analog units that must be reported digitally and set up quick-send messages/reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FBCB2 Systems PCI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure system is present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connect to network and verify blue SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check map load</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CBRN Systems PCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M256 kit on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M11/M13 decontamination apparatus on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masks fitted and checked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPP gear inventoried and accessible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All nonessential equipment stowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment covered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antidote kits on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCS and emplace M22, Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra filters and expendables on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark contaminated casualty evacuation site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CBRN Systems PCI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO GO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify team members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify program, activity/topic date</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section V: Fixed-Site Operations

In the current theater of operations, CF are establishing fixed sites in remote locations with austere facilities. Terminology currently applied to these fixed-site operations includes logistics support area, forward operations base (FOB), joint security site, joint security station, joint contingency operations base, combat outpost, and patrol base (PB). For the purposes of this handbook, the term PB will be used to describe fixed sites occupied by small units of Soldiers familiar with the local area.

The challenges of effectively operating a PB are multidimensional. PBs serve many purposes: defensive strong points, fighting positions, logistics bases, and link-up points for friendly units. Units conducting COIN missions are increasingly staging operations from these small, forward-located PBs.

Units occupy a PB in cooperation with local national security forces (military or police). PBs are proving useful in increasing the security of the local populace. This feeling of security has increased HUMINT sources because people are more willing to talk when they feel safe from the threat of enemy reprisals. Although operations staged from PBs offer some advantages, such as increased local engagement and security, there are also some potential trade-offs in the areas of FP and Soldier quality of life. The shift away from large FOBs to small PBs is placing a greater responsibility on company and platoon leaders. Small-unit leaders must understand and apply the fundamentals of fixed-site security operations to the PBs they establish and occupy and be prepared to interact with leaders of both local national security forces and the local populace.

Sharing hardships and dangers with Iraqi forces promotes comradeship and fosters a sense of legitimacy in the mission of training these forces to defend their country. The increase in security brought about by the constant presence of friendly forces may mean that combined patrols are no longer restricted to moving on the main routes. Patrols may be able to move deeper into neighborhoods, which may translate into a greater ability to capture key assets, such as IEDs and weapons, from the enemy. Because forces are closer to HUMINT sources, operations conducted from PBs may allow more innovative and reactive actions.

Patrol Base Planning

Patrol bases are deliberate combat actions and are not casually planned or emplaced. You, the small-unit leader, must ensure sufficient combat power to secure your unit against a determined, surprise attack. This combat power can be forces on the PB, a robust QRF, and indirect or aerial fire support assets. You must have plans to reinforce your PB in case of attack, as well as redundant communications means to request assistance from ground and aerial fire support assets.

Passive and active security must be planned and developed before, integrated during, and improved after building the PB. The PB should be defensible, but not isolated from the secured area. Defensive barriers, such as “HESCOs” or concrete walls that minimize exposure of the PB’s inhabitants, should be integrated. Fighting positions have to be planned and built. Active measures such as aggressive patrolling, countersniping, adjusting the daily routine, and countering means of indirect fire will prevent an enemy from successfully attacking the PB.
**Patrol Base/Defensive Site Planning Considerations**

Consider the following when establishing or conducting operations from a PB/defensive site:

**Security:** The first priority is establishing all-around security, including patrols and observation posts during periods of limited visibility.

**Protection:** Select positions that provide protection from direct and indirect fires.

**Dispersion:** A position should not be established in a single building when it is possible to occupy two or more buildings that permit mutually supporting fires. A position without mutual support in one building is vulnerable to bypass, isolation, and subsequent destruction from any direction.

**Concealment:** Do not select obvious defensive positions (easily identified and targeted by the enemy).

**Fields of fire:** To prevent isolation, individual and crew-served weapons positions should be mutually supporting and have fields of fire in all directions.

**Covered routes:** Defensive positions should have at least one covered and concealed route that allows resupply, MEDEVAC, reinforcement, or withdrawal without being detected. At a minimum, defensive positions should have a covered route that provides protection from direct fire weapons.

**Observation:** Positions should permit observation of enemy avenues of approach and adjacent defensive sectors. Upper stories of buildings offer the best observation. However, they also attract enemy fire.

**Fire hazards:** If possible, avoid selecting positions that are obvious fire hazards.

**Time:** Time is the one element you have little control over. The most important factor to consider when planning the use of time is to provide subordinate leaders with two-thirds of all available time.

**Force Protection**

Leaders are responsible for FP. Minimum FP considerations include:

- Perimeter security (berms, walls, obstacles)
- Fighting positions (primary, alternate)
- Entry control points
- QRF/reserve (organic and supporting)
- Active security measures, including patrols and observation posts/listening posts
- Passive security measures, including enforcement of noise and light discipline and use of night-vision devices and thermal sights
Patrol Base Operations

PBs require dedicated intelligence and communications assets, not only to receive intelligence passed from higher, but also to develop an intelligence picture from combined patrols. PBs can be squad-, platoon-, or company-sized based on the requirements, but each requires the ability to collate and analyze patrol reports. Augmenting the maneuver element with trained, dedicated, intelligence assets will prevent the diversion of limited maneuver resources to perform this vital function.

PBs require limited self-sufficiency in power generation, sanitation, food/water, and ammunition in order to enable continuous operations if supply lines are cut for a period of time. The greater the distance from support forces, the greater the need for self-sufficiency; however, PBs should never become mini-FOBs. The purpose of PBs is to allow projection of forces into the local community, not to insulate the forces from the local community.

When conducting PB operations, consider and address the following five areas:

• Command post/command and control
• Communications
• Force protection
• Detainee holding
• Life support

Command Post/Command and Control

The CP does not have a set organization. The CP consists of the commander and his radio-telephone operators, fire support team headquarters, communications sergeant, and CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive) NCO. The executive officer, first sergeant, armorer, reserve element leader, and leaders of attached or supporting units may also locate with the CP.

The CP locates where the commander determines it can best support his C2 process. The CP/C2:

• Provides communications with higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting units.
• Assists the commander in planning, coordinating, and issuing orders.
• Provides for its own security.
Communications

The PB must establish communications with:

- Higher units.
- Lower units.
- Adjacent units.
- Supporting units.
- Detainee holding area (DHA).

The PB must have the capability to hold detainees, and leaders must plan accordingly. The DHA is normally located in a safe and secure area capable of receiving and evacuating detainees. The DHA is a temporary location to field-process and house detainees and provide resources for intelligence exploitation. It is generally comprised of a semi-permanent structure designed and resourced to house detainees. Basic elements include:

- Protection against enemy direct and indirect fire
- Shelter or cover from weather
- Latrines
- Basic hygiene facilities
- Medical treatment facilities

You have the responsibility to conduct detainee operations (capture, process, and hold detainees) in accordance with higher headquarters SOPs, Army regulations, and international conventions.

Life support

Soldier well-being is a leader’s responsibility. Life support considerations for a PB include:

- Power
- MEDEVAC plan/provisions
- Minimum medical provisions and designated casualty collection point
- Latrines
- Hygiene
- Water
- Mess and rest areas
PB Priorities of Work

The priorities of work are generally the same as for a FOB; however, because most PBs will be established in urban areas, leaders must give special attention to the unique qualities of the urban environment.

- Select key weapons and crew-served weapons positions to cover likely mounted and dismounted avenues of approach:
  - To cover armored avenues of approach, position anti-armor weapons inside buildings with adequate space and ventilation for back blast (on upper floors, if possible, for long-range shots).
  - Position machine guns (MGs)/squad automatic weapons (SAWs) to cover dismounted avenues of approach. Place them near ground level to increase grazing fires. If ground rubble obstructs grazing fires, place MGs/SAWs in the upper stories of the building. Ensure weapons are mutually supporting.

- Clear fields of fire. Prepare loopholes, aiming stakes, sector stakes, and target reference points. Construct positions with overhead cover and camouflage (inside and outside).

- Identify and secure supersurface and subsurface avenues of approach (rooftops, stairwells, sewers, and basements).

- Stockpile ammunition, food, drinking water, medical supplies, and firefighting equipment.

- Construct barriers and emplace obstacles to slow enemy movement and deny the enemy access to streets, underground passages, and buildings and to:
  - Integrate barriers and obstacles with key weapons.
  - Cover all barriers and obstacles by observation and fire (both direct and indirect).
  - Conceal the obstacle from enemy observation as much as possible.
  - Erect the obstacle in an irregular pattern to hinder enemy movement.
  - Employ the obstacle in depth (if possible). Tie the obstacle in with existing obstacles.

- Improve and mark movement routes between positions, as well as routes to alternate and supplementary positions.

- Improve routes by digging trenches, using sewers and tunnels, creating entry holes, emplacing ropes for climbing and rappelling, and emplacing ladders for ascending and descending.
Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM)

A key weakness for any base is predictability. RAM consistently change the look of PB FP measures. Surveillance is one of the first steps insurgents take in planning an attack on a fixed site. The insurgent observes a PB, looking for vulnerabilities in the security posture. RAM introduce uncertainty to a site’s overall FP program in order to defeat surveillance attempts and make it difficult for the enemy to accurately predict friendly actions. With proactive leader involvement and emphasis, RAM can and will effectively reduce the predictability factor and eliminate an adversary’s advantage.

Leader RAM actions

- Maintain SA of area and ongoing threats.
- Notify all personnel of any changes in threat conditions, especially those dictating changes in protective measures.
- Ensure personnel are alert and immediately report any threat or suspicious activity.
- Ensure personnel avoid routines and vary times and routes.
- Increase the number of visible security personnel wherever possible.
- Rearrange exterior vehicle barriers, traffic cones, and roadblocks to alter traffic patterns near facilities; cover by alert security forces.
- Institute/increase vehicle, foot, and roving security patrols, varying them in size, timing, and routes.
- Implement random security guard shift changes.
- Designate a QRF/reserve for contingencies.
- Limit the number of access points and strictly enforce access control procedures.
- Implement stringent identification procedures, including conducting 100-percent “hands-on” checks.
- Increase perimeter lighting.
- Deploy visible security cameras and motion sensors.
- Institute a robust vehicle inspection program.

(Note: For additional information, see the Joint Forward Operating Base Handbook and CALL Handbook No. 07-19, Base Defense. Both are available on the CALL Web site, <http://call.army.mil>.)
Section VI: Biometrics at the Company Level

What is Biometrics?

Biometrics is a method of measuring an individual’s physiological and behavioral characteristics in order to establish that individual’s identity with certitude. Biometrics is part of the Department of Defense (DOD) effort to gain “identity dominance” in the COIN operational environment.

Identity dominance occurs when the DOD can identify, track, and further exploit persons of intelligence and national security interest despite their efforts to hide within a population. With identity dominance, the DOD can link an enemy combatant or similar national security threat to his previously used identities and past activities.

Biometrics captures physiological characteristics (iris, fingerprints, face), along with other physical features (height, weight, hair and eye color, and gender) and tags the data to an individual. The biometric data is then archived to a common database for future reference.

Information gathered during military operations is processed and compared to biometric information in the database. The resulting intelligence information is provided to the Soldier conducting the operation.

Benefits of identity dominance at the company level

Biometrics is successful only when the company leadership embraces it and understands how to exploit its capabilities.

Biometric devices:

- Enable your Soldiers to enroll and match identities of individuals from a large data source (up to 10,000 identities).
- Give you instant access to DOD watch lists of high-value human targets.
- Provide on-site criteria for detaining or releasing individuals enrolled/screened with biometric devices. This keeps your Soldiers from being burdened with detaining large numbers of personnel and moving them to holding areas for later screening.
- Provide the tools for vetting Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) assigned or operating in your AO (helps identify AIF masquerading as IA/IP).
- Enhance FP when used for access control.

Biometric data you collect becomes an important part of the overall intelligence picture.

The Army is fielding select biometric collection systems down to the squad level. You and your Soldiers must have biometric training prior to deploying into combat.
This training should begin at home station and continue with collective training events at a combat training center or mobilization station.

You must understand how to integrate biometrics into your mission planning and execution. In the COIN environment, small units conduct a majority of the missions; therefore, it essential that leaders have situational understanding of biometric capabilities and ensure their Soldiers use the equipment.

You will utilize two primary biometric systems: the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE). BAT is generally employed as a biometrics collection, databasing, and repository tool at the company level and above. HIIDE collects biometric data on individuals during tactical operations. HIIDE has a database that can store watch lists and information on persons of interest (downloaded from the BAT). Information stored in HIIDE can provide Soldiers the necessary information to determine whether an individual should be detained or released.

(Note: GTA 30-03-002, HIIDE, and GTA 30-03-001, Biometric Automated Toolset [BAT] Smart Card, are included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

At the end of a mission, the Soldier uploads data collected in HIIDE to the BAT system. The BAT system then moves this data to regional and national databases for sharing, storing, and matching.

Planning considerations

- If available, you should have, at a minimum, one HIIDE per platoon.
- The company must have at least two trained BAT operators and eight HIIDE-trained operators. HIIDE is a train-the-trainer device, requiring limited but focused operator-level training.
- The BAT database is classified. Commanders must be aware of this and ensure appropriate operations security considerations are followed.
- HIIDE requires minimal logistical and maintenance support. HIIDE requires two internal batteries and a spare that can provide up to six hours of operation. HIIDE maintenance is contractor-supported, so be familiar with their procedure for getting work done.
- Operators must upload HIIDE-collected biometric files and tracking reports to the BAT to ensure conversion into the BAT database. Ensure that the watch list is current (updated at least daily, if possible). Updating requires data transfer from BAT to HIIDE and HIIDE to BAT. When operating at remote sites where only the HIIDE is used, a prearranged download and upload of the most current information is required.

The process of enrolling and screening takes time and must be conducted in a secure site environment. Include this in your mission planning.

CAUTION: NEVER enroll U.S. Soldiers, civilians, or contractors in the BAT database.
Chapter 4

Threats

Section I: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and IED Defeat (IEDD)

“IEDs are proving to be an adaptive and difficult weapon to protect against, and the urban and COIN environments are extremely challenging.”

Captain, Armored Cavalry Troop Commander

You are responsible for ensuring that each of your Soldiers understands the IED threat and the techniques for defeating IED attacks.

(Note: GTA 90-01-001, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Vehicular Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Smart Card, is included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

**The IED Threat**

The IED remains a significant threat to Soldiers, mounted or dismounted. IEDs may be simple or sophisticated in their construction, with a variety of triggering devices.

Early in Operation Iraqi Freedom, bomb makers used abandoned military ordnance as the main component of their IEDs. This is still true today. Any enemy bomb-making cell with access to artillery or mortar rounds can put together an IED. The composition of IEDs is expanding and so are the delivery means. IEDs can be mobile (e.g., a car loaded with propane gas tanks) or stationary (e.g., an artillery shell buried along a roadside). The enemy makes every attempt to conceal an emplaced IED in the surrounding environment. The newest insurgent tactics is to combine IED explosive force with a chemical attack by attaching the IED to large toxic chemical containers.

(Note: GTA 03-06-010, Actions Upon Attack or Discovery of Chemical Agents, is included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

Timers on IEDs are normally used to act as a safe separation barrier. On many occasions, timers will be used to initiate the IED. When used as a barrier, the timer separates the power source from the electric blasting caps to provide the insurgent more safety during emplacement and time to leave an area. This technique permits unskilled emplacers to arm a device with less likelihood of premature detonation.

**Command-Initiated IED**

- Command-wire IEDs use a wire that directly connects the triggerman and the IED. Command-wire IEDs take time for the enemy to emplace. Because of this, the enemy often attempts to emplace command-wire IEDs at night. The wire leading from the device to the firing point may be concealed (although not always). Once the IED is in place, the firing
point is fixed. Know your terrain and put yourself in the position of the enemy to determine possible triggerman positions. Expect the enemy to locate in a hidden position (behind an earthen berm or in an abandoned house/building) that may be up to 1,000 meters from the IED location. Recent improvements in this capability include micro-thin wires that make spotting the wire leading to the device very difficult.

- Radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) are the most common variant of command-initiated IEDs currently used by the enemy in Iraq. A variety of radio-control (RC) devices are used to activate IEDs. Anything that transmits a radio signal can be adapted to function as a triggering device. Examples include: modified car alarms, garage-door openers, car-door openers, Motorola hand-held radios, toy car or airplane controllers, wireless doorbells, long-range cordless phones, family radio system (FRS) radios, and cellular telephones. With time, the enemy has continued to improve device design and construction techniques. RCIEDs also have a reduced signature and can be emplaced more quickly than command-wire IEDs. RC devices give the enemy standoff capability.

Victim-Operated IED (VOIED)

VOIEDs include booby traps, pressure strips, passive infrared actuators, and trip wires. The devices have been created as a response to coalition forces’ (CF) actions with IEDs. VOIEDs are often located where Soldiers might easily find them or where Soldiers previously have been observed handling discovered IEDs. VOIEDs also have been placed on less-trafficable roads primarily used by CF. The initiation systems range from the simple pull pin to much more complicated devices, such as passive-infrared-actuated shaped charges.

Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)

The potential for a VBIED to employ huge amounts of explosives against a fixed or moving target with catastrophic results makes them one of the most deadly forms of attack. Defense against VBIEDs requires alert Soldiers, good tactics, and constant evaluation of the local situation. VBIEDs are employed either as a stationary attack (a parked car along the roadside) or in a mobile attack with a suicide driver.

- Mobile VBIEDs move to the intended target. A common tactic used by insurgents is to park alongside a route and wait for a convoy to pass. The bomber then drives the VBIED into the convoy and detonates it. A variation of this technique is a “straggler” vehicle that drops behind moving Iraqi civilian traffic. As the patrol/convoy passes the straggler, the vehicle swerves into the patrol and detonates.

- Stationary VBIEDs typically occur along coalition routes. The bomber parks the VBIED on the roadside and initiates the attack as a convoy/patrol passes.
Directional IED

Directional IEDs contain explosively formed projectiles/penetrators (EFPs), also referred to as a “self-forging fragment” due to its unique ability to shape itself into a molten-metal slug. EFPs are capable of penetrating the toughest armor in the world, creating catastrophic kills.

Hoax IED

The enemy uses hoax IEDs to accomplish two things:

- Observe how Soldiers react to the hoax IED in order to prepare a later attack, and/or
- Set up a patrol for an attack in another kill zone.

First, insurgents place the fake device in an easy-to-spot location. Enemy forces watch or videotape coalition actions, such as security, command post locations, distances, and explosive ordnance disposal team actions. The enemy reviews this information to identify patterns. When he thinks he can predict CF actions, the enemy uses that information to place actual IEDs for an attack. Because the enemy has watched the reaction of previous patrols, he puts genuine IEDs at likely checkpoints or security locations. After he sets off the genuine IED, the enemy might also attack with shoulder-fired anti-tank (RPG) rockets or small-arms fire.

IEDD Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

You should conduct IEDD IPB before each mission/patrol. Start by knowing the terrain you are covering inside and out. Get the most current information from the S-2 on threats in your operational area. When evaluating IPB factors, think in terms of the enemy, times, places, and targets. Know the hot spots and why they are hot spots. Hot spots could be located in bad neighborhoods, near cell towers used for signal strength and observation, or near religious landmarks used for observation.

IPB factors in predicting potential IED attack sites:

- History of previous attacks or a site’s previous successes (e.g., Tier 1 IED sites have a history of four or more IED attacks [detonated or not] within a 1,000-meter radius in a 30-day period).
- Terrain:
  - Choke points
  - Good overwatch position (observer or triggerman)
  - An escape route for the enemy (triggerman or complex attack)
  - Obstacles between the IED site and initiation point
  - Concealed location that provides cover for IED emplacement
• Potential for IED attack:
  ° Urban environment:
    * Locations where traffic and/or people and vendors cause the patrol to slow down or make frequent stops
    * Buildings with windows and balconies, proximity of rooftops (observers/triggerman or ambush locations)
    * Linear formation due to channeling
  ° Rural environment:
    * Greater potential for buried IEDs and larger IEDs; greater secondary threat.
    * Enemy can observe your movement for longer periods of time and from greater distances.
    * Where are the unsecured bridges, checkpoints, and close structures?
  ° Highway main supply route or alternate supply route:
    * Overpass, bridges, and under overpass
    * Unguarded checkpoints and obstacles
    * Culverts and crossovers
    * In the median, guardrails, curbs, and shoulders of roadway (usually within 10 feet)
    * Roads that have a high volume of CF traffic

**IEDD Fundamentals**

1. Maintain an offensive mindset.

2. Develop and maintain situational awareness before the mission begins and maintain it throughout execution. All Soldiers should be observing their sectors and communicating what they see up, down, and laterally. You should continuously ask yourself: “What is the enemy’s most probable course of action?” A common operating picture is a clear understanding of the current situation in all adjacent units’ areas of operation (AOs). You can reduce the risk associated with any situation by increasing your knowledge of the terrain and friendly, neutral, and enemy forces.

3. Avoid setting patterns and predictability. The enemy has demonstrated the capacity to assess unit actions and develop tactics, mitigating the effectiveness of
unit battle drills. You should presume the enemy is watching during all missions. Avoiding repetitious actions will confuse enemy perceptions.

4. Use 360-degree security. This should be a constant consideration for Soldiers and leaders at every level during execution. It is the responsibility of every Soldier to coordinate their left and right limits with the adjacent Soldiers to ensure sectors of scan are always interlocking. As a leader, you should be asking yourself: “How can I cover likely threats?”

5. Maintain your standoff distance. Standoff is essential to correctly distinguishing threats and civilians on the battlefield. It is critical for units to use escalation of force (EOF) effectively. All Soldiers should be asking themselves: “How can I maintain a safe distance?”

6. Keep tactical dispersion. To reduce risk, patrols must maintain as much separation between vehicles and personnel as the situation dictates. You must fight the tendency to close formations during halts.

7. Use armor protection. Armor saves lives. Use it, but do not become tied to it. Take advantage of opportunities to dismount, when the situation allows, for interaction with civilians or when carrying the fight to the enemy.

8. Use counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW) devices. Plan where to position the CREW to defeat RCIED threats during movement and at halts. During planning, consider observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover/concealment, and pattern analysis in order to identify likely threat locations:

- Maintain tactical intervals to mitigate other existing threats.
- Use two CREW vehicles in a five-vehicle patrol.
- When approaching likely attack spots, lead and scan with CREW vehicles.
- Use CREW vehicle to cover likely attack spots while the remainder of patrol passes.
- When establishing a security perimeter, place CREW vehicle(s) to cover likely triggerman locations.
- When cordonning IEDs, position CREW vehicle(s) between likely triggerman location(s) and friendly forces.

CREW systems are effective for countering RCIED attacks. The CREW works to break the electronic link between the IED and the trigger (triggerman). CREW comprises a variety of devices that collectively form a reliable defense against RCIEDs. Because of its sensitive nature, details about the CREW system will be shared with you when you reach the AO. Although there is some disagreement about the reliability of the CREW, proper training and adhering to correct techniques for employing the CREW makes the system work. Treat the CREW as a crew-served weapon system.
Detecting IEDs

Use Size, Shape, Location, and Details (SSLD) to Detect IEDs

Using SSLD, you can effectively drive at 5-10 mph in a moderately active AO and find most of the IEDs along your route. The SSLD method is a systematic sequence for evaluating potential IEDs.

- Size:
  - How big is the object? Is it big enough to make a hole in your door or just stir up some dust?
  - Do not bother with trash smaller than one-half the size of a meal, ready to eat box unless it is covering soil or an old blast crater. Is it big enough to hold a mortar round?
  - If it is small, does it move? An IED will not blow away even when other trash does.
  - Remember, the big stuff can be farther down the road and still do a lot of damage, so keep in mind the location from the roadside.
  - If you answered yes to any of the questions above, check out the shape and location of the potential IED.

- Shape:
  - The shape of the garbage, rock, box, or tin can is important. Can you identify anything abnormal about the appearance of the object?
  - Is the tire bulging or disfigured?
  - Is the box modified in any way?
  - Is the garbage bag disfigured? (If garbage is on the road, you should remove it after interrogation.)
  - Does the curbing differ in any way from the curbing beside it? Anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) form blocks and curbing at another location, so the shape will differ slightly from the rest of the curbing in width and length.
  - Is the traffic cone bulging in any way?
  - If the potential IED meets the size and shape criteria, look at its location.
• Location:

  ° How far off the road is the object, relative to its size?
    * AIF need to put smaller IEDs closer to the target.
    * AIF can put larger IEDs on the curb or median and still get the desired effect.
    * AIF can put EFPs even farther from the roadside.

  ° Is it in an old blast hole?
  ° Is it concealed by barbed wire or garbage?
  ° Are you traveling in a known hot spot?
  ° If you answered yes to any of these questions and the potential IED meets the size and shape criteria, definitely interrogate.

• Detail:

  ° Does the texture of the potential IED match its surroundings?

  ° Is the rock the same texture and size as its surroundings? EFPs are generally encased in mortar, glued-on dirt, and grass and painted to replicate its surroundings.

  ° Does the moisture content of the soil near the object match its surroundings? The dirt covering buried IEDs will appear wet when newly buried due to the moisture content of the upturned soil, but will dry faster than surrounding area.

  ° Is that tree trunk pointed in the direction of traffic?

  ° Can you detect wire coming from that dead animal carcass? (Remove dead animals to the roadside after interrogation.)

  ° Is that cord leading off the road detonation cord?

  ° Is the garbage composed or wrapped with a rice bag, inner tube, or other common IED concealment means special to your AO?

#1 Common Sense IED Indicator

Was it (tire, block, curb, bush, sign, pile of garbage) there the last time I drove by? You will not know if you were not paying attention on the last trip.
Detecting IED/VBIED While On Patrol

- Commonly used concealment means:
  - Guard rails
  - Trash piles
  - Burlap bags
  - Cardboard boxes
  - Blocks of concrete
  - Dirt piles, rock piles, or rubble
  - Dead animals near roadway

- Environmental changes:
  - Road repairs
  - New signs on high-traffic CF routes

- Decrease in normal traffic (vehicle or pedestrian)
- Abandoned vehicles, carts, or trailers on side of road
- Traffic that has pulled over to let convoy pass
- Traffic merging from side roads or on ramps
- Oncoming traffic with no hard barrier or median separation
- Vehicles driving erratically or rapidly closing on convoy
- Vehicles that follow or travel ahead of your convoy for a long distance and then pull off to the side of the road
Actions on contact with an IED

Remember that the IED is just one part of an ambush. Once the IED detonates, the enemy may attack with small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, secondary IEDs, or a suicide VBIED (SVBIED). The enemy may have mortars and rockets zeroed in on the IED kill zone or safe area. The unit must be ready to react to any threat after the IED detonates.

Actions on contact for a found IED or VBIED while mounted:

- Alert:
  - Alert the vehicle crew of the possible IED and its location.
  - Alert the unit/element using contact report (identification, direction, distance, description). Use a marking device or signals for vehicles without communications.
  - If stopping the vehicle will put it within 50 meters of the IED, the driver should speed up and quickly move through the danger area to any available hard cover (minimum safe distance 300 meters or as determined by the terrain).
  - Drivers who can stop before entering within 50 meters of the IED should immediately turn or back away from the IED (minimum safe distance 300 meters or as determined by the terrain) and place the vehicle behind any available hard cover.

- Tactical posture:
  - Maintain tactical readiness to counter a possible ambush, counterattack, or snipers.
  - Maintain site security and heighten force protection until properly relieved.
  - Use the 5- and 25-meter (5/25) check technique to scan for secondary IEDs.
  - Implement the 5 C’s (clear, confirm, cordon, control, check)
  - Employ CREW within the system’s capabilities.

- Other considerations for confirming the presence of an IED:
  - Scan for secondary IEDs around the vehicle.
  - Look for the triggerman.
  - Look for a cameraman.
  - Look for anyone trying to escape the area.
  - Watch for approaching VBIEDs.
Actions on contact for an IED strike or detonation while mounted:

- Alert:
  - Alert the unit element using contact report (identification, direction, distance, description).

- Tactical posture:
  - Maintain tactical readiness to counter a possible ambush, counterattack, or snipers.
  - Maintain site security and heighten force protection (FP) until properly relieved.
  - Be alert for the presence of toxic fumes that may indicate a chemical agent.
  - Implement the 5 C’s.
  - Use the 5/25 check technique to scan for secondary IEDs.
  - Employ CREW within the system’s capabilities.

- Complete consolidation and reorganization tasks:
  - Direct all elements to report using the ACE (ammunition, casualties, equipment) report format.
  - Initiate a 9-line medical evacuation request as soon as any serious or critical casualties are identified and immediately begin medical treatment.
  - Establish a landing zone or conduct ground evacuation of casualties.
  - Recover any disabled vehicles.
  - All available personnel should immediately look for the triggerman and/or cameraman.
Actions on contact for an SVBIED attack:

• Alert:

  ° Alert the vehicle crew of a possible SVBIED and its location.

  ° Alert the unit/element using contact report (identification, direction, distance, description).

• Tactical posture:

  ° Initiate EOF measures.

  ° All elements not engaging the SVBIED take immediate cover.

  ° Maintain tactical readiness to counter a possible ambush, counterattack, or snipers.

  ° Maintain site security and heighten FP until properly relieved.

  ° Employ CREW within the system’s capabilities.

  ° Once the threat has been stopped, implement the 5 C’s

  ° Be alert for the presence of toxic fumes that may indicate a chemical agent.

  ° All available personnel should immediately look for the cameraman/observer.
Section II: Sniper Attacks

“If I was an enemy sniper, where would I engage the U.S. forces from?”

Sergeant First Class, Scout Platoon Sergeant

“You’re on patrol, and you take one or two rounds at your patrol …. You look out there and it could have come from literally several hundred different windows. And you don’t have any idea which one. That’s what makes the sniper threat in urban terrain so difficult.”

Infantry Battalion Commander

Sniper attacks against U.S. forces, while deadly, cause a relatively small proportion of total combat deaths and injuries. The impact of these casualties, however, is magnified by the extensive media exposure sniper attacks receive from the insurgents in their Web-distributed videos and by the domestic press. Heightened concern for personnel losses by U.S. military commanders, in part fueled by persistent (and some would say successful) insurgent information operations to publicize sniper effectiveness, has caused the Army to redouble its efforts to mitigate enemy sniper attacks.

The positioning of greater numbers of units and Soldiers in small, fixed sites deep within Iraqi towns and cities has also increased the exposure of U.S. military personnel to insurgent sniper attacks. Many of these fixed sites are surrounded by buildings of equal or greater height, which provide insurgent snipers numerous places from which to conduct observation and precision fires. The requirement to establish perimeter security (towers, sandbagged roof positions, or mobile dismounted guard posts) around these sites further exposes Soldiers to enemy precision small-arms fire. Although efforts to develop and field technical solutions to the sniper problem continue, such solutions are difficult to employ successfully in the urban environment, where most sniper casualties occur. You must take additional measures to protect your Soldiers against increased insurgent sniper attacks.

(Note: GTA 90-01-007, Counter-Sniper Pocket Guide, and GTA 80-01-002, Capture Avoidance/Personnel Recovery Plan, are included on the DVD accompanying this handbook to assist you throughout your deployment.)

The following guidance on how to avoid sniper attacks is taken from the CALL Soldiers’ Handbook, No. 07-15, The First 100 Days. Additional guidance, specifically intended to assist small-unit leaders in better preparing their Soldiers and units for countersniper activities, is inserted where applicable.
Avoid Being a Target

Limit personal and unit exposure

- Use covered and concealed routes:
  - Avoid large open areas, but move quickly if you must cross.
  - Move along the perimeter of any area you must traverse.
  - Use whatever local concealment is available during movement.
  - Stay away from doorways and windows.
- Move in the shadows and avoid the light:
  - Avoid being silhouetted against lights or skyline.
  - Avoid lighted areas at night.
- Move dispersed; do not gather in clusters when halted.
- Avoid badges of rank or actions between persons that telegraph rank.
- Avoid patterns in movement around doorways and vehicle entry points.
- In turrets and hatches, expose as little of head and body as required by tactical situation.

Use protective equipment

- Wear Interceptor Body Armor (IBA).
- Use uparmored vehicles.
- Erect screens and shields.

Implement active measures

- Occupy or observe high ground to deny enemy use of overwatching terrain.
- Maintain manned observation posts that are well-equipped with sights and sensors.
- Use hardened ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles for mobile observation posts.
- Conduct combat patrols and use small kill teams to deter and kill enemy snipers.
If attacked by sniper (and rules of engagement permit), return fire immediately, if possible; seek covered position; and execute “react-to-enemy-sniper” battle drills appropriate for situation.

- Use the clock method (“sniper at 3 o’clock”) to indicate the enemy sniper’s location or to designate a primary direction of fire.
- Employ smoke or other available obscurants to hinder follow-on shots.
- While one friendly element fires at the sniper, another friendly element can maneuver to eliminate or capture the sniper.
- If enemy sniper persists over time, request support by U.S. forces snipers.
- If you are occupying a patrol base (PB) (joint security site or combat outpost), initiate proactive measures to mitigate vulnerability to insurgent snipers:
  - If you can influence the decision of where the PB is located, keep Soldier and unit vulnerability to enemy sniper fire high on your list of considerations. Select a building higher than surrounding structures or on commanding terrain.
  - If you have no choice in the physical location of the PB, conduct careful analysis of the terrain surrounding your facility. Pay special attention to places from which enemy snipers could observe, fire, and escape by a concealed route. Take necessary measures to reduce risk from these places.
  - If you have access to a U.S. forces school-trained sniper team, seek their assistance in conducting this terrain analysis. They can look at your patrol base from the enemy sniper’s perspective and help you to address identified vulnerabilities.
  - Train Soldiers who will be manning guard posts in basic countersniper tactics, such as:
    * Avoid silhouetting yourself.
    * Stay behind cover.
    * Annotate range cards with known or suspected sniper positions.
    * Do not expose your positions by firing at night.
  - Do not exaggerate the skill or effectiveness of insurgent snipers. Do not succumb to the enemy’s information operation.
Insurgent Sniper Weapons and Ammunition

• The majority of insurgent snipers operating in Iraq today are trained marksmen with standard-issue rifles or purpose-built sniper rifles.

• These rifles fire the medium-velocity 7.62 x 39-mm cartridge or the larger, higher-velocity, and more powerful 7.62 x 54-mm rimmed cartridge.

• At current engagement ranges, either cartridge is effective against unprotected targets.

• When snipers have access to and are firing armor-piercing ammunition, their fire is also effective against protected targets.

• Snipers with greater marksmanship skills are attempting to target U.S. military personnel in places where they may be more vulnerable—at the margins of their IBA or where IBA does not provide coverage. This increases the importance of proper fit and wear of IBA for all personnel.

• Insurgents, over time, may gain access to heavy (.50 caliber) anti-materiel rifles smuggled in from Iran. If you think these weapons are being used against your unit, if you capture any from insurgents, or if you discover any large-caliber rifles or loose .50-caliber ammunition in cache sites, be sure to report and forward these items to your intelligence staff immediately for analysis.

Urban Sniper Threat

• Because of terrain, shots can be made at closer range from buildings or specially modified vehicles. In the case of vehicles, ensure Soldiers know what specific vehicles are on the “be on the lookout” (BOLO) list.

• At these ranges, insurgent snipers can use a variety of weapons, firing medium- or high-velocity ammunition.

• Urban snipers can hide easily and escape quickly. An urban sniper rarely operates alone; he has a spotter, perhaps a cameraman, and a driver.

• Presence of innocent civilians prevents an overwhelming firepower response. However, it will not deter the sniper from taking his shot or a follow-up shot.

Countersniper IPB

You should conduct IPB before each mission/patrol to identify situations and locations that indicate a potential sniper attack. IPB begins with a good reconnaissance (ground, aerial, or map/photo) and understanding of the terrain in your AO. Get the most current information on the sniper threats in your operational area from the S-2. Have friendly forces recently captured sniper rifles/ammunition in searches or a recovered weapon caches? This may signal the presence of snipers in your area. What are the details of recent sniper attacks?
Consider the enemy’s point of view. Because it takes time to set up a sniper attack, the enemy prefers to engage friendly forces in predictable places. These are places (or activities) where Soldiers perform the same actions with little variation. If the sniper knows you will return, he will wait, knowing a target will present itself.

Snipers can be part of a complex ambush, combined with IEDs and other small arms. Locations and tactical situations of IED attacks are also prime conditions for sniper activity.

Consider these enemy sniper practices when conducting your IPB:

- Enemy sniper ambush tactics:
  - Shooting distance is from 25 to 300 meters.
  - Generally, the sniper shoots from street level (gun-to-target line is street level).
  - Enemy will shoot with Iraqi civilians in the kill zone.
- Enemy snipers look for stationary vehicles, set up their position, and wait for troops to return to vehicle.
- Enemy is targeting vulnerabilities in Soldier’s body armor:
  - Side
  - Shoulder
  - Hip/thigh
- Expect sniper activity to occur as quickly as 20 minutes after responding to the site of an attack.
Section III: Safety

“The best thing to do to ensure survivability is to stress safety. There are more noncombat-related deaths than actual combat deaths.”

1st Lieutenant, Transportation Platoon Leader

“Accidents were unnecessary 85 percent of the time, but happen all the time. Vehicle rollovers, fires, weapon discharges, heat/cold effects.”

Sergeant First Class, Tank Platoon Sergeant

Avoiding Accidents

More than 600 Soldiers have died from noncombat-related incidents in Iraq. The leading cause of accidental death is motor vehicle accidents, followed by illnesses and firearms-related incidents.

Motor vehicle accidents

Among fatal noncombat-related incidents, the motor vehicle accident is the most easily prevented. Most motor vehicle accidents have occurred in some configuration of the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), with most fatalities resulting from rollover accidents. Common factors contributing to rollover accidents include:

- Collisions with other vehicles or fixed objects.
- Rollovers induced by a sudden collision-avoidance maneuver or swerve.
- Driving along canals or on levees that collapse under the weight of the HMMWV and result in Soldiers drowning.
- Driving while wearing night-vision goggles.
- Ejection of Soldiers not wearing seat belts.

Operating motor vehicles and heavy equipment safely is both an individual and collective responsibility. Young Soldiers tend to operate close to their personal limits and the limits of their equipment. It is your responsibility to supervise and intervene, when necessary, until your Soldiers develop the self-control needed to operate equipment safely. Every vehicle operator must be trained in the safe operation of the vehicle. Enforcing safety standards in everyday activities is absolutely necessary. “Vehicle commander” is not just a seat and a title—it is a responsibility to oneself and to the Army for the safe operation of a motor vehicle.
Other causes of accidental death

- Negligent discharge (predominately the M9 pistol):
  - Failing to clear the weapon properly
  - Handling weapon carelessly
- Ghillie-suit fire (two fatalities in one incident, smoking related)
- Electrocution using a power washer
- Detonation of unexploded ordnance in a sleeping area
- Falling through a trapdoor from a guard tower
- Falls from helicopters
- Broken chain/cable during a recovery effort

Interceptor Body Armor

You deployed to Iraq with an ensemble of personal protective equipment known collectively as IBA. This ensemble includes several components:

- Outer tactical vest (OTV) equipped with modular lightweight load-carrying equipment (MOLLE)-compatible webbing hangers that facilitate attaching other personal-equipment items.
  - Without small-arms protective inserts (SAPI), the OTV will provide protection against penetration of fragments and bullets up to 9 mm in size.
  - With the addition of front and rear SAPI, protection will increase to block penetration of 5.56-mm and 7.62-mm rounds.
- Removable collar/throat protector
- Deltoid (shoulder) and axillary (armpit) protectors
- Removable groin protector
- Upper leg protector (above the knee)

If all components are worn in combination, IBA covers 75 percent of the body with ballistic protection.

You may curse IBA because it is hot, heavy, and bulky, and it may hinder mobility. When it comes to wearing IBA, your goal should be to strike a balance between protection and effectiveness. Leaders should carefully evaluate operational factors and determine the appropriate level of IBA to be worn. Soldiers should wear at least that level of IBA and more if their personal physique, level of fitness, and duty position permit it. IBA saves lives.
Appendix

Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)

Small-unit leaders generally understand TLP and are familiar with the eight-step process. However, in many cases, small-unit leaders fail to use TLP in planning company and platoon operations. This often is due to poor time management, failure to understand the importance of TLP, or leader complacency. Regardless of the type of operation—a checkpoint, combat logistics patrol, or cordon and search—failure to understand and properly conduct TLP has a detrimental effect on mission accomplishment. In training, failure to use TLP effectively results in embarrassment in an after-action review. In war—Soldiers die!

Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, describes TLP as “a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation.” TLP provide the framework for leaders to make the best use of planning time while preparing their unit for a mission. The sequence of the TLP steps is not rigid; leaders can modify them to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps must occur in sequence, while some are done concurrently or continuously throughout the mission. Leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve tactical problems. For example, a company commander may use his executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist him during TLP.

Eight-Step TLP Process

1. Receive the mission:
   - Consider factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) in order to:
     - Understand commander’s intent.
     - Determine specified and implied tasks.
     - Extract your mission (task and purpose).
     - See yourself (identify any issues which affect the mission).
     - Determine additional resources needed.
   - Do an initial reverse time planning schedule.
   - Restate the mission (who, what, where, when, why).

2. Issue the warning order (WARNO) within 15 minutes:
   - Mission:
     - Time and nature of operation
   - Task organization (manifest)
• Initial timeline
• Special instructions:
  ° Precombat checks (PCC) and precombat inspections (PCI)
  ° Rehearsals
  ° Additional task
• Service and support:
  ° Classes I, III, and V
  ° Maintenance and recovery
  ° Medical evacuation
• Command and signal:
  ° Time and place of operations order (OPORD)

3. Make a tentative plan:
• Based on your earlier analysis and consideration of METT-TC, build the plan.
• Put the enemy on the map and include civilian actions.
• Assign troops to key and specific tasks.
• List subordinate tasks and coordinating instructions.
• Plan for contingencies and integration of attachments.
• Plan route (include threat assessment).
• War-game your plan against enemy and critical events.
• Complete tactical risk assessment and mitigation.

4. Initiate movement:
• May be a concurrent action while planning is ongoing
• Move attached units
• Link up
• Relocate (to assembly area or vicinity start point [SP])
• Staging vehicles
• Topping-off vehicles
5. Conduct reconnaissance:
   - Types:
     - Ground
     - Air
     - Map
     - Imagery
     - Previous convoys
   - Purpose:
     - Confirm/validate the tentative plan.

6. Complete the plan:
   - Apply results of the reconnaissance, modify plan as necessary.
   - Use five-paragraph OPORD format.
   - Reconfirm timeline.
   - Finalize convoy manifest.
   - Verify accuracy of strip maps; have one per vehicle.

7. Issue the order:
   - All subordinate leaders attend (include attachments).
   - Determine who gets copies of manifests, maps, etc.
   - Assemble in march order.
   - Pass out strip maps and graphic control measures.
   - Paragraph 3 must have visual aids:
     - Terrain model
     - Diagrams
   - Speak in plain English; avoid acronyms/jargon.
   - Refer to notes.
   - Have subordinate leaders brief areas they control.

8. Supervise and refine:
• Perform confirmation briefs immediately after OPORD.

• Have special team leaders give back briefs after they have completed their plans.

• Spot-check Soldiers for understanding of mission/plan.

• Conduct rehearsals:
  ° Crew drills
  ° Specialty team rehearsals
  ° Battle drills

• Supervise (spot-check) PCC:
  ° Vehicle and weapon maintenance
  ° Load plans
  ° Special team equipment

• Key leaders perform PCI to ensure all deficiencies have been corrected.

Warning Order

As a company commander or platoon leader, you must issue a WARNO as soon as you complete your initial assessment of the situation and available time. Do not wait for more information; issue the best WARNO with the best information at hand and update it as needed (with additional WARNOs, if required).

Put as much detail as possible in the WARNO. The WARNO tells subordinate leaders the unit mission and the timeline for preparation. Include any instructions or information you think will help subordinates prepare for the new mission, including information on the enemy, the nature of the higher headquarters plan, and any specific instructions for unit preparation.

Warning order format

1. Situation: This is a general overview of enemy and friendly situation in the AO. Friendly units are those that might provide direct support to the unit during the operation.

   a. Enemy forces. Include significant changes in enemy composition, dispositions, and courses of action. Information not available can be included in subsequent WARNOs.

   b. Friendly forces (optional). Address only if essential to the WARNO:

      • Higher commander’s mission
• Higher commander’s intent

c. Environment (optional). Address only if essential to the WARNO:

• Terrain
• Weather
• Civil considerations

d. Attachments and detachments. Initial task organization. Address only major unit changes.

2. Mission: The mission statement is a clear, concise statement of what the operation is to achieve. The statement will contain who, what, when (normally SP time), where (normally a designated route), and why (the purpose).

3. Execution:

a. Concept of operations. This may be “to be determined” for the initial WARNO.

b. Tasks to maneuver units. Any information on tasks to units for execution, movement to initiate, reconnaissance to initiate, or security to emplace.

c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units. See paragraph 3(b).

d. Coordinating instructions. Include any information available at the time of the issuance of the WARNO. It may include the following:

• Commander’s critical information requirements
• Risk guidance
• Timeline
• Deception guidance
• Orders group meeting information
• Specific priorities, in order of completion
• Earliest movement time and degree of notice
• Guidance on orders and rehearsals

4. Service and support: Include any known logistics preparations. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) should determine much of this information. This section can be used for changes or additional information.

a. Special equipment. Identify requirements and coordinate transfer to using units.
b. Transportation. Identify requirements and coordinate for pre-position of assets.

c. Class I (rations and water)

d. Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricant)

e. Class V (ammunition and pyrotechnics)

f. Class VIII (medical, combat lifesaver, and supplies)

5. Command and signal:

   a. Command. State the chain of command if different from unit SOPs.

   b. Signal. Identify the current signal operating instructions. Pre-position signal assets to support operation.

6. Special instructions: Guidance concerning PCC, PCI, rehearsals, and/or additional tasks to be accomplished.
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Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned, ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350.

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